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Abstract
Three Essays on the Demand for Cigarettes
by
Yan Song
Adviser: Professor Michael Grossman
This dissertation mainly consists of three essays of original research.
Therefore, Chapter 1, the primary focus of this essay is to use a long time series of state cross
sections for the 1955-2009 time period in the United States in order to predict cigarette con-
sumption. This essay updates estimates of the rational addiction model of cigarette consumption
obtained by Gary Becker, Michael Grossman, and Kevin Murphy in their seminal 1994 American
Economic Review paper. By using two types of prices, the cigarette price and the cigarette tax,
and employing a cigarette demand function, I verify that smoking is a rationally addictive form
of behavior. This is based on the theory that current smoking behavior is affected by both past
and future smoking behaviors. Furthermore, I estimate long-run and short-run elasticities and
find that the long-run elasticity is larger than that in the short run.
Chapter 2, the primary focus of this essay is to obtain new estimates of the price sensitivity of
cigarette consumption and related outcomes using the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY79). This work expands on the existing literature on the topic by taking
into account measures of time preference in the NLSY79 to examine interactions between these
measures and price in the demand function for cigarettes. My specific hypothesis is that those who
discount the future consequences of their current actions heavily are likely to be more sensitive
to price than those who do not. I find that the people who discount the future heavily are more
sensitive to price change.
Chapter 3, in this essay I explore the smoking behavior of pregnant women using the 1979
cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). A key aspect of this research
is the availability of smoking participation data before and during pregnancy. Thus, I con-
sider the probabilities of quitting while pregnant as outcomes. I find that pregnant women who
are cigarette consumers are less responsive to price changes because they are a future oriented
group. Individuals who are more present-oriented are more likely to smoke and to consume more
cigarettes given that they do smoke than those who are more future-oriented. Moreover, those
who discount the future more heavily will be more sensitive to the money price of cigarettes
than those who are more future-oriented. I find that a one percent change in the money price of
iv
cigarettes represents a larger percentage change in the full price for the former group. I focus on
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Chapter 1
Rational Behavior in Cigarette
Consumption: Evidence from the
United States
1.1 Introduction
Despite overwhelming research on its damaging effects to human health, increased taxes and
pricing, and an active societal campaign against it, people continue to smoke cigarettes and
smoking endures as a social issue. Although some would attempt to explain this phenomenon
through a myopic model of behavior which implies that current consumption is only affected by
past consumption. However, I will argue that a rational behavior model, which emphasizes that
both the future price and past consumption will affect current consumption, better accounts for
this human activity.
In one of the more acclaimed studies, Becker et al. (1994), an empirical analysis related to
cigarette demand, marshal empirical evidence from 1955 to 1985 to show that cigarette demand
rises as prices decline. This study concludes that cigarette smoking is explained best by the
rational behavior model. In this paper, I examine whether their results can be verified by
extending the data from 1954 to 2009 (Tax Burden on Tobacco). At the same time, I will apply
smoking participation–Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)–as another type of
consumption, seeking to verify the rational behavior model.
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Instead of the myopic theory that addictive current consumption is affected only by past con-
sumption, Becker and M.Murphy (1988) suggest that addictive current consumption is affected
by past and future consumption. The empirical estimation implemented by Becker et al. (1994)
uses a rational model and a myopic model with OLS and 2 SLS methods of estimation. These
two papers represent the standard model for later rational behavior research.
In the 1970s, researchers suggested that, for addictive products, the influence of past consump-
tion on current consumption is greater than that of future consumption on current consumption.
In contrast, by using cigarette consumption data, citetBecker:1994 found that consumers behave
in a rational additive manner, with past and future consumption affecting current consumption.
Their paper demonstrated that higher future prices lead to lower current consumption, indicating
forward-looking behavior.
However, Gruber and Koszegi (2001) assert that the addictive rational model is valid when
time preference is held constant. If time preference varies, the "policy" of addictive cigarette
consumption will change. Gruber and Koszegi develop an alternative model, in which they
embed in the Becker-Murphy framework the hyperbolic discounting preferences provided by
Laibson (1997). Becker et al. (1994) can be a special case of the Gruber and Koszegi (2001)
model. In order to achieve better estimation, Becker et al. (1994) put proper restrictions on the
discount factor (from 0.7 to 0.95). In contrast, instead of calibrate the discount factor, Gruber
and Gruber and Koszegi (2001) estimate the value from the empirical data. While Gruber and
Koszegi (2001) also used high frequency monthly data on cigarette consumption, they found that
the new model and new data indicated that future prices have an effect on current consumption.
The results are similar to those of Becker et al. (1994).
In order to test the applicability of the rational addictive and myopic models, researchers
have employed various data. Instead of the state aggregate sales data used by Becker et al.
(1994), Levy (2010) applies the individual-level annual data in the National Vitality Statistics
Natality Data (NHIS). He finds that while young smokers only respond to the current cigarette
price, mature smokers respond to both current and expected future prices. Labeaga et al. (1999)
also applies the individual-level data to the Becker et al. (1994) model. Kim (2005) applies
three measurements of consumption to myopic and rational models: the proportion of smokers,
per capita consumption, and the average daily cigarette consumption of smokers.Lanoie and
Leclair (1998) used Canadian data at the state level for the period from 1954 to 2009; Hu et al.
(1994) analyzed data from 11 western states over the period 1967-1990; and in order to provide
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more intuitive explanations for addictive behavior, Suranovic et al. (1999) added quitting cost
("frustrated or anxious or restless") and the negative effects of smoking (later appearing in an
individual’s life) to the model. All of these studies support the rational addictive model and
reject the myopic model.
Scholars have also employed different estimation models. Because individual level data yield
a distribution for disturbance exhibiting non-constant variance, economists have resorted to a
two-part model: first, a logit or probit specification and, second, an ordinary least squares (OLS)
model. In practice, people subject the dependent variable of the OLS regression model to a
logarithmic transformation in order to stabilize non-constant error variances. Mullaphy (1998),
Manning (1998), Manning and Mullaphy (2001) and Tauras (2005) have each investigated the bias
associated with using log-transformed dependent variables and conclude that the price coefficients
obtained from a conditional demand equation are biased when using a traditional log-transformed
dependent variable.
In sum, the literature suggests that cigarettes are addictive and, furthermore, that cigarette
addiction follows the rational behavior model. In this study, I use a broader data set to verify
this result, extending the Becker et al. (1994) data to include the years 1954 to 2009. I employ
both the myopic and the rational behavior model and include two measures of consumption:
(i) per capita cigarette consumption (in millions of packages) from state level annual data from
1954 to 2009 (Tax Burden on Tobacco); and (ii), annual smoking participation (current smoking
status) data from 1984 to 2009 (BRFSS). The results show that a) smoking consumption is a
rational addictive behavior and that b) as prices decrease, consumption increases significantly,
but smoking participation does not change much. The results verify that cigarette consumption
follows rational addictive behavior.
1.2 Empirical Work
1.2.1 Model
Following Becker et al. (1994), we assume a concave utility function as:
U(Yt, Ct, Ct−1, et) (1.1)
3




βt−1U(Yt, Ct, Ct−1, et) (1.2)
subject to a lifecycle budget constraint
∞∑
t=1
βt−1(Yt + PtCt) = A
0
where: Yt is the consumption of a composite commodity in period t; Ctis the number of
packages of cigarettes consumed; β is the discount factor. et represents unobserved variables
affecting utility (Becker et al., 1994). These unobserved variables cause an endogenous consump-
tion problem, the reason the two stage least square estimate method is used later. A0 represents
the current wealth. By maximizing utility, we get the first order condition.
Uy(Ct, Ct−1, Yt, et) = λ
U1(Ct, Ct−1, Yt, et) + βU2(Ct+1, Ct, Yt+1, et+1) = λPt (1.3)
Rearranging the first order utility, results in the consumption equation, which is the regression
equation:
Ct = θCt−1 + βθCt+1 + θ1Pt + θ2et + θ3et+1 (1.4)
where: Pt is the current price of cigarettes, and etand et+1 are "shift variables". This equation
determines current cigarette consumption.
Equation (1.4) is the regression of rational addictive cigarette consumption. Equation (1.3)
represents that marginal utility of current cigarette consumption ( U1), plus the discounted
marginal effect on the next period utility of today’s consumption (U2), which is equal to the
current price multiplied by the marginal utility of wealth (Becker et al., 1994). By concavity of U
4
we know that θ1 is negative. Equation (1.4) implies that increases in the current price decrease
current consumption. If θ is positive, increases in past consumption and future consumption
raise current consumption. So as past or future cigarette prices decrease, current consumption
increases. In the myopic model, first-order condition does not include future utility (βU2), so
there is no future consumption term in equation (1.4). Therefore, the difference between rational
and myopic models is that rational addictive individuals increase their current consumption as
future prices are expected to fall, but myopic addictive individuals do not (Becker et al., 1994).





θ(1− φ1)(φ2 − φ1)











1 + (1− 4θ2β)1/2
2θ
with 4θ2β < 1 for stability.
1.2.2 Estimation Method
Following Becker et al. (1994), I use the myopic and rational addiction models. First, I per-
form an OLS regression to estimate normal results. However, due to missing observations, past
consumption and future consumption may be correlated to the error term. Because all of the
consumption data for the regression cannot be collected, unobserved consumption included in
the error term is correlated to the independent variable "past and future consumption". This en-
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dogeneity problem requires the use of two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation. Because current
consumption is unrelated to past and future prices when other variables are held constant, past
and future prices can be used as instruments. Moreover, since excise taxes imposed on cigarettes
are important exogenous factors determining cigarette prices, excise tax rates may also be used
as instruments.
Following Becker et al. (1994), the same instruments for consumption will be applied in both
the myopic and rational model price equations. In this case, tax refers only to state tax. For all
other equations, tax includes federal and state tax.
1.2.3 Data
Data for prices, taxes and consumption come from Tax Burden on Tobacco (Volume 44, 2009).
Data is at the state level for the period from 1954 to 2009. The tax instrument for consumption
in the myopic and rational model price equations is state tax (Table 1, 2). For all others the
tax instrument is (federal + state) tax. Price and tax have been adjusted for CPI increases
(1967=100).
Fiscal years ending June 30 are used for prices, taxes and consumption. Price data are
collected in November of each year. As taxes may vary by month and year, tax is matched to
price by first subtracting tax from the November price, using data from Tax Burden on Tobacco
(Volume44, 2009), then adding the change in tax for month and year to the corresponding monthly
price. After getting the right monthly price (including tax), we collapse it into an annual price
again.
Consumption is per capita annual sales (in millions of packs) of state tax-paid cigarettes
from 1954 to 2009. The base period of CPI is 1967=100. Real Tax = (Federal + state) tax.
Consumption is state Tax-paid Cigarette Sales (in millions of packs).
Data for smoking participation comes from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS). Smoking participation (current smoking status) is annual from 1984 to 2009. Smoking
participation represents current smoking status. I refer to those people who smoke every day and
those who smoke on some days as "current smokers"; people no longer smoking and people who
never smoked are referred to as "nonsmokers".
Data for state level per capita income come from the Statistical Abstract of the United States
and data are available from 1955 to 2009, so this income variable is used as an exogenous variable
in the regression. The data constitute a panel of the 50 states of the U.S. over time.
6
Figure 1.1: Real Price and Tax Data Distribution. Note:the base period of CPI is 1967=100;
Real Tax = (Federal + state+county) tax.
Figure 1.2: Daily Cigarette Consumption Distribution.1984 to 2008.
7
Figure 1.3: Participation Distribution.Note: In 1984, "smoked 100 cigarettes in lifetime" was not
part of the questionnaire, which may affect the measure of participation for 1984.
1.2.4 Empirical results
According to Becker et al. (1994), if a positive past consumption coefficient is significant, holding
other variables constant, then this consumption follows addictive behavior. Larger values of
the past consumption coefficient (θ) mean greater degrees of addiction. From the consumption
regression (Table 1.1), one can see that the past consumption, real cigarette price and income
coefficients are significant. Therefore, cigarettes are addictive both in terms of consumption and
smoking participation in the myopic model.
In Table (1.1), there are fewer observations in column (4) than in column (2) and (3) because
the instruments in column (4) include additional second lag taxes and second lag prices. The
more lags used, the more observations are lost and, therefore, there are fewer observations in the
results.
Elasticity shows that, as current prices increase by 10 percent, cigarette consumption decreases
by 3.5 percent in the short-run and 12 percent in the long-run; cigarette participation decreases
by 0.1 percent in the short-run and 0.5 percent in the long-run.
The coefficient of past participation is greater than that of consumption, indicating that
smoking participation is more addictive than consumption. Insignificant elasticity suggests that
price does not have a significant effect on smoking participation. This result is similar to the
finding of Kim (2005) (page 56)
In the consumption equation (Table 1.2), past and future consumption, real cigarette price,
8
Table 1.1: Myopic Models (Price).
Consumption Equation Participation Equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Past 0.92∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ - - - -
Consumption (0.01) (0.056) (0.078) (0.058)
Past - - - - 0.29∗∗∗ 0.82 ∗∗∗ 0.90 ∗∗∗ 0.70 ∗∗∗
Participation (0.043) (0.13) (0.112) (0.116)
Real price - 0.54 ∗∗∗ -1.435∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ -1.00 ∗∗∗ -0.00013 -0.00005 -0.00005 -0.0009
(0.092) (8.211) (0.25) (0.209) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Income - 0.06 -0.434∗∗∗ -0.328∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ 5.49e-06 -0.00007 -0.00008 -0.0002
(0.051) (0.187) (0.172) (0.150) (0.0002) (0.0012) (0.0001) (0.0002)
R2 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.85 0.80 0.78 0.80
FIV - 51.19 23.81 15.18 - 4.47 3.40 2.69
(P-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.039 0.04 0.041
Wu-F(endog) - 39.94 39.95 26.74 - 2.64 4.30 3.80
(P-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.043 0.057
χ2(overid) - - 94.02 127.82 - - 0.53 4.00
(Sargan P-val) 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.26
LR elasticity -1.87∗∗∗ -1.154∗∗∗ -1.215∗∗∗ -1.261∗∗∗ -0.304 -0.052 -0.074 -0.049
(0.338) (0.22) (0.25) (0.259) (0.068) (0.156) (0.27) (0.098)
SR elasticity -0.16∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.009 -0.007 -0.015
(0.027) (0.067) (0.074) (0.062) (0.050) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Regression OLS 2sls 2sls 2sls OLS 2sls 2sls 2sls
State Year
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2688 2645 2645 2600 1071 1071 1071 969
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Significant level at 5 %: F(1,50)=4.03: F(2,50)=3.18; F(3,50)=2.79; F(4,50)=2.56; χ2(1)=3.84; χ2(2)=5.99; χ2(3)=7.81;
In the consumption equation, tax is state tax. In the participation equation tax is (federal + state) tax.
First IV (2) (6) is just identifying restriction, so there is no over identifying test.
In over-identifying tests, the consumption IV (3) (4) equation results show that the null of over-identifying restriction valid
is rejected (p-value=0.00), which means over-identifying instrument IV (3) (4) may not be valid. Similar results
appear in all the over-identifying instrument tests for consumption (including price and tax, myopic and rational model).
The Instruments: (in the consumption equation) in column (2) past price; in column (3) past price, current state tax,
past tax; in column(4) past price, current state tax, past tax, second lag tax, second lag price.
The Instruments: (in the participation equation) in column (6) first lag tax; in column (7) one lag tax, one lead tax;
in column (8) one period lag tax, first and second and third period lead tax.
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Table 1.2: Rational Models (Price).
Consumption Equation Participation Equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Past 0.49∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ - - - -
Consumption (0.004) (0.087) (0.046) (0.044)
Future 0.49∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ - - - -
Consumption (0.003) (0.106) (0.060) (0.074)
Past - - - - 0.20∗∗∗ 0.65 ∗∗∗ 0.55 ∗∗∗ 0.47 ∗∗∗
Participation (0.033) (0.213) (0.217) (0.201)
Future - - - - 0.26∗∗∗ 0.25 ∗∗∗ 0.33 ∗∗∗ 0.43 ∗∗∗
Participation (0.033) (0.261) (0.364) (0.401)
Real price - 0.24 ∗∗∗ -1.359∗∗∗ -0.649∗∗∗ -0.738 ∗∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.001
(0.041) (0.169) (0.166) (0.181) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001 (0.0001)
Income - 0.017 -0.400∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ 0.00026 0.0001 0.00009 0.0001
(0.011) (0.154) (0.08) (0.096) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
R2 0.98 0.97 0.98 -0.98 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.82
FIVt−1 - 29.19 20.78 15.86 - 4.30 2.15 2.59
(P-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.019 0.088 0.063
FIVt+1 - 17.20 11.14 9.76 - 3.35 6.28 2.22
(P-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.043 0.0004 0.097
Wu-F(endog) - 29.84 12.20 11.40 - 1.60 1.11 1.11
(P-value) 0.00 0.00 0.0001 0.21 0.34 0.34
χ2(overid) - - 101.48 174.69 - - 1.97 2.47
(Sargan P-value) 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.12
LR elasticity -4.451∗∗∗ -1.206∗∗∗ -1.372∗∗∗ -1.389∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.190 -0.149 -0.146
(1.491) (0.234) (0.31) (0.313) (0.077) (0.38) (0.334) (0.481)
SR elasticity -0.658∗∗∗ -0.548∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗ -0.501∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.050 -0.050 -0.044
(0.027) (0.110) (0.120) (0.131) (0.020) (0.062) (0.061) (0.065)
Regression OLS 2sls 2sls 2sls OLS 2sls 2sls 2sls
State Year
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2688 2594 2594 2594 1071 1071 1071 966
Significant level at 5 %: F(1,50)=4.03; F(2,50)=3.18; F(3,50)=2.79; F(4,50)=2.56; χ2(1)=3.84; χ2(2)=5.99; χ2(3)=7.81;
Tax is using state tax only for consumption instrument.
In consumption IV (3) (4) equation estimates cannot reject the null of over identifying restriction being valid (p-value = 0.00),
which means over identifying instrument may not be valid.
Instruments: (in the consumption equation) in column (2) lag price, lead price; in column(3) lag price,
lead price, current tax, lag tax; in column(4) lag price, lead price, current state tax, lag tax, lead tax.
Instruments: (in the participation equation (tax is using federal and state tax)) in column(6) past tax,
second lead tax; in column(7) lag tax, second lag tax, one lead tax, second lead tax; in column (8) lag tax, second lag tax,
third lead tax.
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and income are significant. If past and future consumption positively correlate with current
consumption, it indicates that the rational addictive model applies to cigarette smoking. It
also indicates that myopic theory does not apply, since this theory suggests that only past con-
sumption "reinforces" current consumption. Even though positive past and future consumption
correlate significantly with current consumption, the estimated results are not very robust sup-
port for rational theory. Assuming a time preference discount factor equal to the interest rate,
the estimated discount factor β (the ratio of the coefficient of future consumption to the coef-
ficient of past consumption) should be equal to 1/(1+r) (r is the estimated interest rate). The
purpose of the discount factor is to examine whether the estimatedβ fits the real world or not. A
discount factor β between 0.7-0.95 and r between 3-40 percent is good. However, in consumption
equations our discount factors range from 0.164 to 1.23, corresponding to r from -18.7 to 509.7
percent. The best discount factor, which comes from column (4), is 0.572 corresponding to an r
of 74 percent. The wide range of discount factors suggest that the interest rate is "implausible".
According to Becker et al. (1994), this "implausible" phenomenon can be accounted for by future
price changes.
In the smoking participation equation the coefficient of future consumption is insignificant.
Thus, it does not support the rational theory.
In the consumption equation, elasticity shows that as the current price increases by 10 percent,
cigarette consumption decreases by 5 percent in the short-run and by 13 percent in the long-
run. In Becker et al. (1994), as the current price increases by 10 percent cigarette consumption
decreases by 4 percent in the short-run and by 7 percent in the long-run.
In the participation equation, elasticity shows that as the current price increases by 10 percent
cigarette consumption decreases by 0.5 percent in the short-run and by 1.5 percent in the long-
run.
Evans et al. (1999) show that by using The Tax Burden On Tobacco, the coefficient of nominal
tax on average cigarette retail price is 1.01 and the coefficient of real tax on price is 0.92, which
implies that a one cent change in taxes will cause approximately same amount change in prices.
They also point out that replacing price with taxes can directly capture the variation sourcing
from taxes for prices across states excluding other endogenous market factors.
In table 1.3, using tax data, past consumption, future consumption and price are all significant
in the consumption equation but not in the participation equation. There is evidence of rational
addictive behavior in the tax consumption equation as well as in the smoking participation OLS
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Table 1.3: Myopic Models (Tax=federal+state tax).
Consumption Equation Participation Equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Past 0.93∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ - - - -
Consumption (0.01) (0.085) (0.086) (0.058)
Past - - - - 0.28∗∗∗ 1.70 0.50 0.12
Participation (0.045) (8.51) (0.36) (0.23)
Real cigarette - 0.36∗∗∗ -1.385∗∗∗ - 1.44∗∗∗ -1.72 ∗∗∗ -0.0006 ∗∗ -0.003 -0.0004 -0.0008 ∗∗
tax (0.156) (0.39) (0.47) (0.587) (0.0003) (0.0077) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Income - 0.016 -0.471∗∗∗ -0.446∗∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗ 0.00005 -0.00003 0.0001 0.0001
(0.051) (0.279) (0.276) (0.279) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0005)
R2 0.98 0.94 0.95 -0.95 0.85 0.17 0.83 0.83
FIV - 24.187 11.52 8.28 - 0.087 1.25 1.51
(P-value) 0.00 0.0001 0.00 0.76 0.30 0.21
Wu-F(endog) - 57.75 42.09 49.43 - 0.587 0.358 0.187
(P-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.447 0.55 0.67
χ2(overid) - - 27.33 27.39 - - 1.41 2.65
(Sargan P-val) 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.45
LR elasticity -0.52∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.112) (0.12) (0.121) (0.016) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017)
SR elasticity -0.039∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.027 ∗∗ -0.119 -0.020 -0.038∗∗
(0.017) (0.042) (0.05) (0.061) (0.012) (0.368) (0.018) (0.016)
Regression OLS 2sls 2sls 2sls OLS 2sls 2sls 2sls
State Year
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2689 2688 2637 2600 1071 1071 1020 969
Significant level at 5 %: F(1,50)=4.03; F(2,50)=3.18; F(3,50)=2.79; F(4,50)=2.56; χ2(1)=3.84;χ2(2)=5.99; χ2(3)=7.81;
Instruments: (in consumption equation) in column (2) lag tax; in column (3) lag tax, lead tax; in column (4) lag tax,
first , second and third lead tax;
Instruments: (in participation equation) in column (6) second lag tax; in column (7) lag tax, lead tax, second lead tax;
in column (8) lag tax , first and second and third lead tax.
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Table 1.4: Rational Models (Tax=federal+state tax).
Consumption Equation Participation Equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Past 0.49∗∗∗ 0.949∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ - - - -
Consumption (0.004) (0.383) (0.081) (0.075)
Future 0.49∗∗∗ -0.99 0.42∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ - - - -
Consumption (0.004) (0.738) (0.136) (0.044)
Past - - - - 0.20∗∗∗ 0.44 0.31 0.42
Participation (0.033) (0.456) (0.34) (0.467)
Future - - - - 0.25∗∗∗ 0.35 0.20 0.15
Participation (0.035) (0.33) (0.42) (0.451)
Real cigratte - 0.213 ∗∗∗ -3.12∗∗∗ -0.973∗∗∗ -1.196 ∗∗∗ -0.0005∗ -0.0002 -0.0004∗ -0.0003
tax (0.06) (0.724) (0.473) (0.416) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Income - 0.036 ∗ -1.099 -0.21 -0.371 0.00005 0.00009 0.00007 0.00008
(0.019) (0.888) (0.146) (0.198) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
R2 0.99 0.76 0.98 0.97 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.84
FIVt−1 - 11.52 10.55 10.71 - 2.32 1.31 1.72
(P-value) 0.0001 0.00 0.00 0.109 0.28 0.18
FIVt+1 - 3.79 12.45 7.26 - 1.04 2.98 2.25
(P-value) 0.029 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.028 0.09
Wu-F(endog) - 19.78 20.16 31.73 - 0.34 0.056 0.13
(P-value) 0.00 0.00 0.0001 0.71 0.95 0.88
χ2(overid) - - 53.07 74.96 - - 1.97 1.21
(Sargan P-val) 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.27
LR elasticity -1.691∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.040∗ -0.040 -0.038 -0.035
(0.626) (0.121) (0.120) (0.124) (0.023) (0.051) (0.026) (0.028)
SR elasticity -0.641∗∗∗ -0.494∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗ -0.493∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.015 -0.014 -0.016
(0.182) (0.185) (0.23) (0.199) (0.007) (0.044) (0.021) (0.030)
Regression OLS 2sls 2sls 2sls OLS 2sls 2sls 2sls
State Year
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2638 2637 2535 2492 1071 1071 1071 1017
All tests are added robust test (cluster). Tax is using state tax only for consumption instrument.
In consumption IV (3) (4) equation estimates cannot reject the null of over identifying restriction being valid (p-value = 0.00),
which means over identifying instrument may not be valid.
Instrument: (in consumption equation) in column (2) lag tax, lead tax; in column (3) lag tax, second and third lead tax;
in column (4) lag tax, second lag tax, first and second and third lead tax;
Instrument: (in participation equation) in column (6) lag tax, second lead tax. In column (7) lag tax, second lag tax,
first and second lead tax; in column (8) lag tax, second lag tax, second lead tax.
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regression. Evidence of addictive behavior in smoking participation was found in the 2sls model,
but not in the OLS regression. Thus, the consumption equation supports rational addictive
behavior, but the smoking participation data does not. This only occurs in the OLS regression,
but because Ct+1 is endogenous (as is Ct−1 ), OLS estimates are biased and therefore less credible
than 2SLS estimates.
Price is significant and negatively correlated to consumption in the consumption equation.
However, in the smoking participation equation there was not a significant and negative relation-
ship between price and consumption as there was in the price estimation.
Long-run price elasticity was smaller in both the tax consumption and tax smoking-participation
equations than in the price regression.
1.3 Robustness test.
In order to check whether the estimation is correct, the regression results were compared toBecker
et al. (1994) results from the same time period. The original data of Becker et al. (1994) were
consumption, price and income. It shows that the price coefficient is similar.
Comparing the results to the Becker et al. (1994) data (Table 1.5), the 2sls price coefficient is
around 2.7 and the data price coefficient is 2.9, resulting in a price coefficient close to Becker et al.
(1994). In my data, the income coefficient is somewhat greater than that of the BGM Becker
et al. (1994) data. One possible reason is that the original income data was recently adjusted
by an updated measurement, so that the income data collected now is different from that of a
few years ago. The above results suggest that the data used here are similar to the data used by
Becker et al. (1994) and no bias estimation was caused by the data.
Finally, I compare the real price and income coefficients from the period before (and including)
1985 (the end year for the regression used by Becker et al. (1994)) to the period after 1985. If the
coefficients are significantly different, it will suggest that the characteristics of the data before and
after 1985 are different. The Wald test shows that the two real price coefficients and the income
coefficients are significantly different. Ordinarily, income has a positive effect on consumption,
but some later period income coefficient become negative. This difference, however, does not
invalidate the conclusions. As more information has become available about the harmful effects
of smoking since 1980s, the relationship between income and smoking has switched from positive
to negative: instead of a normal good, cigarette consumption has become an inferior good.
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Table 1.5: Myopic Models of Addiction (Dependent Variable =Consumption).
OLS 2SLS (IV=Past price)
BGM [1994] My data BGM [1994] My data
Past Consumption 0.824∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.042) (0.041)
Real Price - 1.433 ∗∗∗ -1.500∗∗∗ -2.698∗∗∗ -2.920 ∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.105) (0.206) (0.218)
Income 0.272 ∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.698 ∗∗∗ 0.378 ∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.082) (0.132) (0.107)
Note: standard Error in Parentheses.
Table 1.6: Rational Models of Addiction (Dependent Variable =Consumption.
OLS 2SLS (IV=Past and Future price,
past and current tax)
BGM [1994] My data BGM [1994] My data
Past Consumption 0.489∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.050) (0.049)
Future Consumption 0.468∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.061) (0.057)
Real Price - 0.604 ∗∗∗ -0.651∗∗∗ -2.413∗∗∗ -2.600 ∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.083) (0.230) (0.233)
Income 0.171 ∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.669 ∗∗∗ 0.346 ∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.062) (0.122) (0.095)
Price Elasticity - - 0.566 ∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.052)
Table 1.7: Myopic Models of Addiction (Wald Test).
OLS 2SLS (IV=Past price)
My data My data Wald Test My data My data Wald Test
(Year<=1985) (Year>1985) (P-value) (Year<=1985) (Year>1985) (P-value)
Past 0.898∗∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗ 0.37 0.487∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 3.13
Consumption (0.012) (0.018) (0.545) (0.062) (0.121) (0.077)
Real Price - 0.837 ∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ 16.90∗∗∗ -2.699 ∗∗∗ -0.368 21.57
(0.148) (0.086) (0.0001) (0.411) (0.308) (0.000)
Income 0.188 ∗∗ -0.090∗ 28.62∗∗∗ 0.568 ∗ - 0.574 ∗∗∗ 24.02
(0.072) (0.048) (0.000) (0.299) (0.191) (0.000)
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Table 1.8: Rational Models of Addiction (Wald Test).
OLS 2SLS
My data My data Wald Test My data My data Wald Test
(Year<=1985) (Year>1985) (P-value) (Year<=1985) (Year>1985) (P-value)
Past 0.496∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 1.85 0.417∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.39
Consumption (0.004) (0.007) (0.180) (0.067) (0.121) (0.532)
Future 0.481∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 2.55 0.239 0.551∗∗∗ 3.04
Consumption (0.007) (0.004) (0.112) (0.094) (0.207) (0.081)
Real Price - 0.376 ∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ 18.93 -2.017 ∗∗∗ -0.092 35.25
(0.062) (0.039) (0.0001) (0.304) (0.212) (0.000)
Income 0.070∗∗∗ 0.004 8.04 0.297 - 0.376∗∗∗ 6.55
(0.024) (0.015) (0.007) (0.255) (0.125) (0.011)
2SLS (IV=Past and Future price,Past and current tax)
1.4 Conclusion
The results suggest two conclusions. First, smoking is a rational addictive behavior in the con-
sumption equation. Smoking participation has a higher degree of addiction than consumption
in the myopic model, but not in the rational model. Second, decreasing prices significantly in-
creases consumption in the consumption equation, but not in the smoking participation equation.
Long-run elasticity is greater than short run elasticity. The consumption long-run price elasticity
(-1.3) is greater than Becker et al. (1994)’s finding (-0.7). This result may be due to the longer
period of data. Three other variables used by Becker et al. (1994) were omitted and the Wald test
shows that the parameter of price, past and future consumption, and income have been changed
since 1985, so the results cannot be compared to Becker et al. (1994). One reason for using tax
instead of price is to compare long-run elasticities. Since tax is just a component of price, the
long-run elasticity of price is greater than that of tax. Price elasticity is more dominant than that
of the tax. From the data, this result can be seen by comparing the long-run elasticities in the
table. Another reason is that tax is a more exogenous variable than price. Price is an outcome
variable of the supply and demand that drive the cigarette market and, as such, is endogenous.
Tax rates are set by policy makers, not in response to demand conditions. Thus, a change in the
disturbance does not generate a change in tax rates, but may well generate a change in prices. It
can be clearly observed to be a strong instrument for consumption and participation regression.
Therefore, price and tax can be used as instruments in price regression, but only tax can be used
as an instrument in tax regression.
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Two measures of consumption are applied because consumption (from 1954 to 2009, Tax
Burden on Tobacco) and smoking participation (BRFSS) have different characteristics. Past
participation has a greater influence on current participation than it does on future participation.
Since participation has only two discrete choices (smoking or not smoking), past smoking affects
current smoking status, but future smoking does not influence current smoking. The data show
that participation is more addictive in the myopic model and not addictive in the rational model
in 2 SLS (Table 1.1, 1.2). Furthermore, since participation has only two discrete choices, price
changes will not affect participation very much. The results clearly show that price has an
insignificant effect on participation (Table 1.1, 1.2). There is a discount factor restriction test
Becker et al. (1994) and Gruber and Koszegi (2001), which implies that time-preference change
might affect the result of rational behavior. In future research I will examine those tests to see
how time-preference difference affects rational model consequences.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of the Interaction
Between Price and Time Preference
on Cigarette Consumption
2.1 Introduction
It is common knowledge that when the price of a good rises, the quantity demanded of the
good falls. This relationship between price and quantity demanded is true for most goods in
the economy, and even though cigarettes are addictive goods, this downward-sloping demand
law still fits well (Becker et al., 1994). Because each person has a different time preference with
regard to increases in cigarette price, this paper seeks to understand how price affects cigarette
consumption when the individual measure of time preference interacts with price in the demand
function for cigarettes.
When considering economic problems, one cannot ignore issues of psychology (Mankiw, 2009).
In the economic world, everyone faces trade-offs. In order to acquire something one likes, one
must give up another thing one likes, and different people have different attitudes about trade-off
decisions. In the case of smoking, there is always a trade-off between instant gratification and
future harmful consequences.
The primary purpose of this paper is to obtain new estimates of the price sensitivity of
cigarette consumption and related outcomes using NLSY79. The point of departure from the
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existing literature is that I take account of measures of time preference in NLSY79 to examine
interactions between these measures and price in the demand function for cigarettes. My specific
hypothesis is that those who discount the future consequences of their current actions heavily
are likely to be more sensitive to price than those who do not. This hypothesis stems from the
conception of the full price of cigarettes as the sum of the money price and the monetary value
of the expected future harm due to smoking. A one percent increase in the money price results
in a greater percentage increase in the full price for those who discount the future heavily than
for other individuals.
Income influences one’s time preference. According to Becker et al. (1991), in the case of
smoking, teenagers and poorer people are assumed to have lower values of the discount factor
(higher discount rates) because they tend to discount the future more heavily. Poorer and younger
people may care less about their future health or may lack the financial ability to place higher
monetary value on future harm. Also, according to my hypothesis, because they belong to a
low-earning group, the money price accounts for a greater proportion of the full price. These
groups are, therefore, more sensitive to money prices–they underestimate the monetary value of
the harm.
In spite of the case of time consistent preference, the same person may also face time incon-
sistent preferences. As hyperbolic studies of time preference have shown, the discount factor is
much smaller in the short-run than in the long-run. People often plan to diet and quit smoking,
but are more likely to delay their actions in the short run (Harris and Laibson, 2000). People
are more likely to act on the basis of instant rewards and less likely to act on the basis of future
rewards (Laibson, 1997, D.Cohen et al., 2004). The same theory is also demonstrated by the
inter-temporal consumption equation: people consume more in the current period and less in the
future period.
I will use NLSY quasi-hypothetical reward question to measure personal preference. Accord-
ing to Johnson and Bickel (2002) and Madden et al. (2003), quasi-hypothetical questions have
similar results to empirical experiments. I follow Courtemanche et al. (2015) and use the NLSY79
measure of time preference rate, which was only available in 2006. Most of the other control vari-
ables are available in more than one year in NLSY79. By assuming that time preference rates
do not vary over time, I use a 1979 to 2008 survey to estimate demand functions for cigarettes.
Because this is panel data, I also include fixed effects. If I fit an individual fixed effect model,
the discount factor of 1/(1 + time preference rate) would drop out of that specification because
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they do not vary over time, but the interaction between each of these variables and price would
not drop out. In my results, the interaction term between the discount factor and cigarette price
has a positive sign. This supports my hypothesis that patient people are less responsive to price
changes, though the results are insignificant at the 10% confidence interval. Pregnant women are
less sensitive to price changes than others because they think more about the future.
2.2 Empirical Work
2.2.1 Model
To test my hypothesis, I assume that each individual lives for two periods. The lifetime utility
function is
V = U(H0, X,C) + βU(H,X1, C1). (2.1)
Here H0 is initial health and is exogenous. X is consumption of a good other than cigarettes
during period 0, and C is consumption of cigarettes during the period 0. The price of X is $1,
and the price of cigarettes is p. The variables H, C1 and X1 are health, cigarette consumption,
and the other goods in period 1. β is the time discount factor for time. For simplicity, I assume
that lending and borrowing are not possible and ignore the selection of X1 and C1. Hence, the
relevant budget constraint is
I = X + pC (2.2)
Finally, an increase in C lowers health in period 1(∂H/∂C ≡ Hc < 0)
The Lagrange function is
L = U(H0, X,C) + βU(H,X1, C1) + λ(I −X − pC),
where λ is the marginal utility of income.
The first order condition for C is
Uc + βUHHC = λp (2.3)
The second term on the right-hand side of the last equation is negative since UH > 0 and HC <
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0. The previous equation is rewritten as




Note that f ≡ −β UHHCλ defines the discounted monetary value of the loss in utility during
period 1 due to smoking during period 0. Hence, the full price of cigarettes (π) is
π ≡ p+ f
The full price is higher the larger is the value of β.
The way to proceed is to specify a general demand function without assuming anything about
the form of the utility function:
C = C(I, π) (2.4)











Define ε as - Cπ πC , and note that ε is the elasticity of C with respect to full price π. Hence,
e = (p/π)ε
If ε is constant, e rises as β falls because p/π rises as β falls. In other words, people who discount
the future heavily have a more elastic demand function than those who do not because a one
percent change in money price is a greater percentage change in full price for the former group.
Because I am interested in how time preference affects individual responses to price, I simplify
the cigarette demand model, but interact time preference with price:
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Ci,t = αPi,t + α1Pi,tβi + εi,t (2.5)




This can be evaluated at different values of βi. The partial derivative of the price should be
negative, since when the price of goods increases, consumption decreases. The coefficient of
the interaction term α1 should be positive because the greater the discount factor (the smaller
discount rate), the lesser the negative price effect, which means the negative price effect will
decrease as the discount factor increases. When β increases by one percent, the effect of the
price decrease by the value of α1. Therefore, the greater the discount factor (the lesser the
time-preference rate) is, the less patient people respond to price changes.
However, the full price of cigarettes includes the monetary price and the expected value of
the monetary value of harm. People who discount future harm less think that future health is
important. For this group, the expected future monetary value accounts for a greater proportion
of the full price of cigarettes and, therefore, they should be less responsive to the current cigarette
price. Conversely, impatient people pay more attention to the current cost, as is the case with
the poor and with teenagers. Thus, these groups are more sensitive to changes in cigarette prices.
Instead of a constant discount factor overall lifetime, the time-inconsistent case consists of
the long-run discount factor δ and the present-bias β. Economists have used the quasi-hyperbolic
function: 1, βδ, βδ2 , ..βδt , ....When β = 1, it represents the time-consistent preference case,
while β ≤ 1 indicates the time-inconsistent case. In the latter case, δ is constant for all time
and β captures the discount rates decrease in time t. For example, according to the empirically
quasi-hyperbolic examination, the average value of the present-bias discount factor β is 0.8 and
the next period becomes 0.7, diminishing with time (Courtemanche et al., 2015). The short-run
time preference rate is greater than the long-run time preference rate, and the best value for the
long-run δ is 0.7 (Laibson, 1997). Most individuals have a diminishing impatience.
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According to equation (2.5), the partial price effect becomes
∂Ci,t
∂pi,t
= α0 + α1δi + α2βi
Individuals will discount the future less when the long-run discount factor δ is greater or present
bias β is greater and, thus, consumption responds to price less when δ or β is greater. Therefore,
the interaction term of α1 and α2 should be positive. This factor plays a primary role depending
on whether patience is determined by the long-run discount factor or by a present-bias.
2.3 Data
All data come from the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLSY79) and are now available from
Round 1 (1979 survey year) to Round 25 (2012 survey year). They include NLSY79 parents
who were born between 1957-64 and whose ages ranged from 14-22 during the first survey year
(1979). The survey was conducted biennially until 2012. The original sample included 12,686
respondents and, at present,9, 964 remain due to withdrawal from the sample. The dependent
variable is cigarette usage, which is only available in the years 1984, 1992, 1994, 1998, and 2008.
The 1984 consumption and participation data structure are different from 1992, 1994, 1998, and
2008. For example, there was no question regarding "cigarettes smoked in entire lifetime" for the
1984 survey, but it appeared on surveys from later years. Therefore, I estimate the model with
and without the 1984 data. Because the results are not so different, I only show the results for
1992, 1994, 1998 and 2008.
There are two types of cigarette measurements: cigarette consumption and cigarette smoking
participation. Cigarette consumption refers to the number of cigarettes consumed within the
last 30 days. Cigarette participation is the current smoking status: if the person has smoked
within 30 days it is 1; otherwise it is 0. After dropping observations and merging data, there
were 6,599 observations left for the number of cigarette consumed and 25,635 for the number of
cigarette-smoking participants.
Data for prices and taxes come from Tax Burden on Tobacco (Volume 44, 2009). Data are
at the county level for the period from 1984 to 2009. Both price and tax data are in real terms.
The base period of CPI is 1967=100. Taxes in the real term consist of the sum of federal, state
and county taxes.
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Time preference variables (DF1, DF2) are calculated from NLSY79 reward question in 2006
wave. First : "Suppose you have won a prize of $1000, which you can claim immediately.
However, you have the alternative of waiting one year to claim the prize. If you do wait, you
will receive more than $1000. What is the smallest amount of money in addition to the $1000
you would have to receive one year from now to convince you to wait rather than claim the





Second: " Suppose you have won a prize of $1000, which you can claim immediately. However,
you can choose to wait one month to claim the prize. If you do wait, you will receive more than
$1000. What is the smallest amount of money in addition to the $1000 you would have to receive
one month from now to convince you to wait rather than claim the prize now?" Discount factor












DF1 is the annual discount factor; DF2 is the monthly discount factor. According to Laibson
(1997), the next period should be discounted, not only by the standard discount factor δ, but also
by an extra fraction β. The appropriate rate of β should be around 0.7. For a time-consistent
case, δ is constant for each period. For a time-inconsistent case, I assume that impatience is
decreasing for a fixed-time gap. This assumption may represent the fact that people are more
reactive with instant rewards and less reactive to future rewards (D.Cohen et al., 2004). The
same theory is also shown in the inter-temporal consumption equation: people will consume more
in the current period, and less in the future period.
In addition to the independent variable, time-preference, I also include demographic variables:
Age, Gender, Race, Marital Status, Human Capital, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)
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(1988), and Schooling dummies. For example, college is equal to 1 if the highest grade completed
is 16th or over 16th. Labor includes work hours and occupation. I classify occupations as white
collar, blue collar and service, according to the scheme introduced by Courtemanche et al. (2015).
Finally, I add income, income squared, and net worth as financial variables.
2.4 Empirical analysis
2.4.1 Time consistent discount factor
In order to examine how the discount factor affects consumption, I use the following estimating
regression equation:
Cit = α0 + α1DF1i + α2DEMOit + α3HCit + α4LABORi + α5FINit
+ εit (2.6)
where i represents individuals. DF1 is the annual discount factor: DEMO includes age,
gender, race, and marital status; HC (Human Capital ) includes the AFQT score and schooling
dummies; LABOR includes work hours and occupation (for example, blue collar, white collar
and service indicators); and FIN (Financial) includes income, income squared and net worth.
The purpose of equation (2.6) which includes only the discount factor and control variables
is to see the pure effect of the discount factor. On the other hand, in order to examine how
the discount factor influences the price effect on consumption, I use the following estimation
regression equation
Cit = α0 + α1βi + α2DEMOit + α3HCit + α4LABORi + α5FINit
+ α6Pct + α6βiPct + εit (2.7)
where Pc,t is the cigarette price varying over time at the county level. In order to examine how
the discount factor influences the price effect on consumption, I add price and the interaction
term to between price and the discount factor in equation (2.7).
Table 2.3 shows estimates of the equation (2.6) and (2.7). Column (1) is a simple regression
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without price term for consumption. Here, the measure of consumption is the number of cigarettes
an individual consumed last month. It follows the regression in equation (2.6). Columns (2) and
(3) are the estimates of the regression in equation (2.7), which includes the price and interaction
term with the discount factor. Column (3) is estimated with both year and state fixed-effect but
column (2) only with year fixed-effect. Columns (4) and (5), (6) are following equations (2.6)
and (2.7) respectively and the dependent variable is smoking participation, for which I set the
smoker as 1 and the nonsmoker as 0. The greater the discount factor (the lesser the discount
rate) is, the less individuals respond to price. I expect the coefficient of discount factor1 to be
negative, and Columns (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) show that the coefficient of DF1 is negative.
Based on these results, I conclude that people who are present-oriented (i.e. do not value the
future highly), are more likely to smoke.
In columns (2), (3), (5) and (6), the coefficient of price should be negative because when
price goes up, consumption should go down. The coefficient of the interaction term should be
positive because a greater discount factor (a smaller discount rate or more patient individual)
has a negative effect on consumption through price. Therefore, the negative price effect declines
for more patient people. Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) show reasonable results, even though
the coefficients of the interaction term are not significant at the 10% confidence interval, the t-
statistic for the interaction (the coefficient divided by its standard error) is 1.33 for participation
in column (5), which is weakly significant. Therefore, I conclude that people who are present-
oriented are more likely to smoke as cigarette price goes down, even though the results are not
significant.
In the estimation, I used a separate year fixed-effect, and a combined year and state fixed-





This calculation reveals that only the estimate using year fixed-effect has a negative partial price
effect. Therefore, the regression using only year fixed-effect is a more reasonable estimation.
According to the prediction, individuals who are more future-oriented will be less responsive
to cigarette price change. This relationship can be examined in terms of the value of price
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elasticity. As the discount factor increases, price elasticity decreases, indicating that individuals
who evaluate the future highly are less responsive to cigarette price change. This is explained
well by the full price theory, that a one percent increase in price is associated with a smaller
percentage change in the full price for those who are more future-oriented.
2.4.2 Time inconsistent discount factor
In the previous section, I analyzed the discount factor for the time-consistent case. Next, I con-
sider the discount factor for the time-inconsistent case. I use the following estimation regression
equation
Cit = θ0 + θ1βi + θ2δi + θ3DEMOit + θ4HCit+ θ5LABORi
+ θ6FINit + ηit
(2.8)
Cit = θ0 + θ1βi + θ2δi + θ3DEMOit + θ4HCit+ θ5LABORi
+ θ6FINit + θ7Pit + θ8(βi ∗ Pit)
+ θ9(δi ∗ Pit) + θ10ηit
(2.9)
where β is present-bias and δ is long-run patience. I assume the discount factor is decreasing as
time T progresses. δ is constant throughout an individual’s life. β, which captures time variety,
is the value weighted to the constant discount factor δ.
Table 2.4 shows the results for the time-inconsistent case. Columns (1) and (2) are the
regression results for equations (2.8) and (2.9), respectively. Column (3) is the estimation with
year and state fixed-effect for equation (2.9). Columns (4), (5) and (6) show the estimates of
the participation regression. In columns (5) and (6), the coefficients of the interaction between
price and the discount factor presents positive, which are consistent with the hypothesis that
a negative price effect should be smaller for those who are more future-oriented. But they are
insignificant at 5% significant interval level.
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2.4.3 Full Price Model
The Effect of Logarithm of the Price
One may recall that the full price of cigarettes is π = p+f , where f ≡ −β UHHCλ is the discounted
monetary value of the loss in utility in period 1 due to smoking in period 0, and β is the discount
factor. The point is that a one percent change in p is a greater percentage change in π the smaller
is β. For more detail, let the demand function be
C = α+ γ ln(p+ f) = α+ γ ln p+ γ ln[(p+ f)/p] (2.10)
Denote b as the coefficient of ln p in this regression. By the estimated formula, we can get
b = kγ, k ≡ p/(p+ f) (2.11)
Since k is larger for individuals who are less future-oriented, the money price elasticity is
bigger for individual who have smaller values of β and hence smaller values of f . Equation (2.11)
in its constrained form indicates that ∂C/∂ ln p = kγ.
I have β but do not have −(UHHc)/λ. Since k rises as β falls, ∂C/∂ ln p should be bigger in
absolute value the smaller is β. I, therefore, regress C on ln p and β ∗ ln p. The coefficient of the
interaction should be positive, while the coefficient of price should be negative when participation
or consumption is the dependent variable. A one percent increase in price is a smaller percentage
change in the full price for those who are more future oriented. So the negative price effect should
be smaller for them, which is why the interaction effect should be positive.
For a time-inconsistent case, the discount factor β becomes two factors of δ and β, in which δ
is constant over the course of an individual’s lifetime, and β rises with time going. The estimation
should regress C on ln p, δ ∗ ln p and β ∗ ln p. The interaction signs should be positive, and price
effect is negative, as it is in the time-consistent case.
Table 2.6 and 2.7 show the results for this model. In Table 2.6, columns (2), (3), (7) and (8),
the price effect is negative and the coefficient of the interaction term is negative. In Table 2.7,
I add the nonsmoker into observations of consumption. In this way, I reduce the bias caused by
unobservable consumption.
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Approximated full Price Model
Consider one additional point in which future monetary loss is included. Referring to equation
(2.3) we set g ≡ −(UHHC)/λ. f = βg. I have a measure of β but do not have a measure of g. I








This approximation is based on the Taylor expansion up to first order. Even if g is substantial,
the health costs of smoking might not occur for 20 years or so. Suppose the one period discount
factor is 1/1.10 = 0.909. Then the relevant discount factor is (0.909)10 = 0.385. If I use the
approximation, C = α+ γ ln p+ γgβp−1. If g is a constant, the coefficient of βp−1 estimates γg.
In either case, the model I am going to estimate includes ln p and βp−1. Note that the sign of
the interaction is the same as the sign of ln p and is negative. Since with ln p and hence p held
constant, an increase in β raises the full price of smoking (π) and hence lowers the probability
of smoking and the amount smoked given positive consumption. It still is the case that the
price effect falls as β rises. Here, the price effect of ln p is negative, but the price term in the
interaction is 1p , which as a whole has positive effect on consumption. Because an increased β
decreases positive price effect on consumption, the interaction term is negative. The following is
the simplified estimation equation:




= γ − γgβp−1 (2.14)













The estimate model becomes the form:




Here the right-hand side variables are ln p, (β/p) and (1/2) ∗ (β/p)2. The coefficient of (β/p)
estimates γg. The coefficient of (1/2) ∗ (β/p)2 estimates−γg2. The ratio of the last coefficient to
the penultimate coefficient estimates −g.
∂C
∂ ln p





= γ − γgβp−1 + γg
2β2
p2
= γ(1− gβp−1 + g2β2p−2) (2.15)
Table 2.8 and 2.10 are, respectively, the estimate results from regressing C on ln p, βp , and on





2. These results are based on the approximated model as the full price model
in equation (2.10). In Table 2.8 column (2) and (6), the coefficient of interaction as well as the
price effect are negative. The price effect in the interaction term β 1p is positive on consumption,
which is consistent with the prediction. This positive price effect should be smaller for those who
are more future oriented. Therefore, the interaction term should be negative.








Referring to Table 2.10, column (1), g=108.89, the mean cigarette price is 100 ranging from 71
to 281 with standard deviation 22.94. The mean discount factor is 0.56 ranging from 0.0001 to
1 with standard deviation 0.27. So βg/p=108.89*0.56/100=0.609, which proves empirically that
this term is less than 1. It also verifies that the coefficient of log price is negative. From the
calculation of βg/p, it is evident that the term in parentheses in equation (2.14) is positive, and γ
(-0.625), the coefficient of log price in Table 2.10, column (1) is negative. According to equation
(2.14), price elasticity is γ(1 − gβp−1) = −0.625(1 − 0.069) = −0.244, which verifies that the
price effect is negative.













The regression function is
C = γ ln p+ γgδp−1 + γgβp−1 (2.16)
It is still the true that the price effect is negative
∂C
∂ ln p
= γ − γgδp−1 − γgβp−1 (2.17)























The regression model form is







Table 2.8 and 2.10 also report the results for the time-inconsistent regression. In Table 2.8, I
experiment an approximation of future value with a Taylor expansion up to the first order level
as equation (2.12). Both the coefficients of the interaction term and the price effect are negative
in Table 2.8, column (2) and (6), and Table 2.10 column (6), (8) which is consistent with the
prediction. Furthermore, the effect of price is negative. To see this, the results from Table 2.8,
column (1) are applied to equation (2.16), showing that −0.448 − 1.832 ∗ δ/p − 17.1 ∗ β/p are
negative, as δ/p < 1, β/p < 1 and both nonnegative.
2.4.4 First time quitting smoking
A related issue is defining the initial sample (Wooldridge, 2005, Ce, 2011). In my model, it is not
difficult to treat "first-time quitting" as the outcome. I select a sample of smokers from Period
1, defining that period as the first time a given person has smoked. For each individual, Period 1
is potentially a different year. Then I generate a variable for "first-time quitting". The indicator
is 0 for those who start smoking for the first time (Period 1) and, if they continue to smoke, it
remains 0 until the last period. The indicator is 1 if an individual stops smoking for the first time,
after which they drop out of the sample. It must also be noted that year dummies are not the
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same as period dummies. According to Wooldridge (2005), one should consider the initial time
period a parametric nonlinear model. Therefore, I create a period dummy for each "first-time
quitting" smoker, and omit period dummies from the basic model (OLS linear model). I also
omit initial consumption from the basic model, since Hsiao (1986) argues that one should only
be concerned with the initial sample problem in nonlinear models.
Table 2.12 shows good results for the effect of price level on "first-time quitting". The effect
of price is positive and the interaction is negative. If I calibrate DF1 ( discount factor 1) as 0.6 ,
the mean of DF1 in the summary table, the price effect is equal to 0.0006-0.000006*0.6=0.0006 (
following Table 2.12, column (1)). This is consistent with the theory that when price increases,
the probability of quitting increases as well. Also when the discount factor increases, the positive
effect of price decreases and, thus, the coefficient of the interaction term presents a negative
sign. In the time-inconsistent case, the price effect is still positive. If I calibrate Beta as 0.8
and Delta as 0.75 (shown in Summary Table 2.2), the price effect is equal to -0.0003+0.002*0.8-
0.0006*0.75=0.00085 ( following Table 2.12, column (3); for column (4) the result is 0.0005),
which is a positive price effect . As a result, the estimate of the effect of price on "first-time
quitting" verifies the hypothesis that future-oriented people respond less to changes in price level.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the effect of prices on cigarette consumption. This effect varies if an individ-
ual’s time preference changes. I use a proxy measure of time preference from the NLSY79 (2006)
survey to interact with cigarette price. I primarily focus on the interaction term to examine the
effect of time preference on cigarette consumption through the price effect. I find that people who
discount the future consequences of their current actions heavily are likely to be more sensitive
to price than those who do not.
According to the theory, I would expect a negative coefficient for cigarette price when the
dependent variable is cigarette consumption or smoking participation. The interaction term
between price and the discount factor should have a positive coefficient. As demonstrated, patient
people respond less to price because their discount rate is low, which supports my hypothesis
that those who discount the future consequences of their current actions heavily are likely to be
more sensitive to price than those who do not.
I find substantial proof for my hypothesis. In the time-consistent case, the results show that
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the coefficient of the price is negative and the coefficient of the interaction between price and
the discount factor is positive insignificant at the 10% significance level. In the time-inconsistent
case, I have very similar results which show the coefficient of the interaction term is positive.
This points to heterogeneity in the impact of price on cigarette consumption. I also find that as
the degree of patience increases, cigarette price elasticity decreases in absolute value.
These results suggest an important role for heterogeneous time preference in the price effect
while it is insignificant at the 10% significance level. If governments try to reduce cigarette
consumption by increasing cigarette taxes, the responsive groups will be limited to those people
who discount the future heavily, such as teenagers or lower income individuals.
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Table 2.1: Summary for 6599 observations.
Variable Name Description Mean
(Std. Dev.)
Age Age in years 36.03
(6.21)
Female 1 if female 0.484
(0.500)
Race:black 1 if race is black 0.137
(0.344)
Race:other 1 if race is neither black nor white 0.0241
(0.153)
Married 1 if married 0.633
(0.482)
AFQT percentile score on armed forces qualifying test in 1985 49.56
(28.67)
High school 1 if highest grade is completed=12 0.408
(0.492)
Some college 1 if 13 ≤highest grade completed ≤ 15 0.238
(0.426)
College 1 if highest grade completed 16 ≥ 0.284
(0.451)
White collar 1 if current occupation is white collar 0.627
(0.452)
Blue collar 1 if current occupation is blue collar 0.255
(0.407)
Service 1 if current occupation is service 0.117
(0.297)
Hours worked Average hours worked per week in the preceding year 35.66
(19.66)
Income Total household income(units of $10, 000 8.255
(8.201)
Net worth Household asset minus liabilities in 2004(units of $10, 000) 25.86
(46.20)
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Table 2.2: Summary for 6599 observations.
Variable Name Description Mean
(Std. Dev.)
Comsumption The number of cigarette consumed during last month 501.73
(303.11)
Smoking participation Smoking or not (Yes is 1, not is 0) during last month 0.254
(0.435)
Discount factor 1 Computed from amount needed to wait a year to receive $1, 000 0.586
(0.262)
Discount factor 2 Computed from amount needed to wait a year to receive $1, 000 0.284
(0.340)
Delta Computed using the quasi-hyperbolic discounting specification 0.747
(0.334)
Beta Computed using quasi-hyperbolic discounting specification 0.794
(0.216)
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Table 2.3: Results for time consistent OLS regressions.
consumption participation
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Discount factor1 13.83 -10.90 -11.26 -0.028 -0.066 -0.079∗
(18.20) (49.12) (48.25) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Cigarette price -1.647∗ -0.515 -0.0005 -0.00004
(0.69) (0.43) (0.0005) (0.0003)
DF1*price 0.250 0.277 0.0004 0.0004
(0.406) (0.401) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Age 5.633∗ 5.722∗∗ 6.495∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.005∗∗
(2.23) (2.21) (2.13) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female -42.89∗∗∗ -44.01∗∗∗ -49.43∗∗∗ -0.011 -0.011 -0.014
(11.94) (11.88) (11.76) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Married -2.924 -4.083 -9.979 -0.084∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(10.37) (10.26) (9.96) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
AFQT 0.544∗ 0.551∗ 0.573∗ 0.00001 0.00001 -0.0002
(0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
High school -12.32 -13.46 -16.69 -0.118∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(12.10) (12.19) (11.88) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Some college -30.37∗ -30.95∗ -29.51∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗
(14.66) (14.63) (14.39) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
College -131.6∗∗∗ -132.8∗∗∗ -137.3∗∗∗ -0.302∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗
(20.32) (20.48) (20.23) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
White collar -202.4 -208.8 -169.0 0.003 0.004 -0.006
(105.4) (109.3) (126.3) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Blue collar -153.1 -161.0 -127.3 0.059 0.059 0.047
(105.2) (109.1) (126.0) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Service -165.4 -172.5 -130.3 0.038 0.038 0.027
(105.2) (109.1) (126.2) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Work hours 0.198 0.182 0.127 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.288) (0.286) (0.288) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Networth 0.248 0.231 0.244 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Income -0.227 0.172 1.821 -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(3.49) (3.48) (3.40) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 6599 6599 6599 25742 25697 25697
R2 0.123 0.126 0.152 0.095 0.095 0.110
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Discount factor1 refer to annual discount factor
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Table 2.4: Results for time inconsistent OLS regressions.
consumption participation
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Delta 6.779 -17.96 -18.96 -0.017 -0.049 -0.054
(12.14) (33.23) (33.09) (0.011) (0.029) (0.029)
Beta 34.80 57.21 61.35 -0.006 -0.007 -0.025
(22.14) (63.15) (62.35) (0.02) (0.046) (0.046)
Cigarette Price -1.534 -0.379 -0.0006 -0.0002
(0.83) (0.62) (0.001) (0.0004)
Beta*price -0.215 -0.250 0.00001 0.0001
(0.528) (0.524) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Delta*price 0.244 0.272 0.0003 0.0004
(0.280) (0.278) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Human capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labor Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 6599 6599 6599 25635 25635 25635
R2 0.123 0.127 0.153 0.095 0.095 0.108
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
"Demographic" includes age, gender ,race, and marital status.
"Human capital" includes AFQT score and the high school, some collage,collage indicators.
"Labor" includes work hours and white collar, blue collar, service dummies.
"Financial" includes income, income2 , net worth, variables .
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Table 2.5: Results for consumption including all nonsmoker .
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DF1 -9.150 -36.69 -44.27
(10.57) (26.15) (25.86)
Cigarette price -0.726 -0.206 -0.713 -0.249
(0.396) (0.196) (0.422) (0.259)
DF1*price 0.268 0.305
(0.188) (0.188)
Delta -5.844 -30.03 -33.25
(7.308) (19.42) (19.23)






Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 25635 25635 25635 25635 25635 25635
R2 0.086 0.086 0.102 0.086 0.086 0.102
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.6: Results for time consistent and time inconsistent, regressor being ln(price) and discount
factor*ln(price).
time consistent time inconsistent
consumption participation consumption participation
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DF1 0.049 -0.013 -0.233 -0.264
(0.527) (0.529) (0.169) (0.169)
ln( price) -0.566∗∗ -0.050 -0.145 0.0003 -0.564∗∗ -0.042 -0.151 -0.014
(0.177) (0.132) (0.081) (0.045) (0.213) (0.176) (0.087) (0.058)
DF*ln(price) -0.005 0.010 0.0443 0.050
(0.114) (0.114) (0.036) (0.036)
Delta -0.140 -0.176 -0.192 -0.199
(0.363) (0.365) (0.137) (0.136)
Beta 0.242 0.266 -0.016 -0.090
(0.657) (0.657) (0.222) (0.221)
Beta*ln(price) -0.041 -0.046 0.002 0.017
(0.142) (0.142) (0.047) (0.047)
Delta*ln(price) 0.034 0.042 0.039 0.040
(0.078) (0.078) (0.029) (0.029)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 6599 6599 25697 25697 6599 6599 25697 25697
R2 0.130 0.157 0.096 0.110 0.130 0.157 0.096 0.109
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.7: Results for consumption including nonsmoker with regression on ln(price) and discount
factor*ln(p).
time consistent time inconsistent
consumption
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DF1 -8.934 -157.6 -174.9
(10.52) (118.0) (117.7)
ln(price) -148.6∗∗ -26.02 -146.2∗ -29.43
(55.62) (30.10) (60.16) (37.59)
DF*ln(price) 32.25 35.21
(24.50) (24.46)
Delta -5.649 -129.5 -134.3
(7.304) (91.20) (90.30)






Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 25635 25635 25635 25635 25635 25635
R2 0.085 0.087 0.102 0.085 0.087 0.102
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.8: Results for time consistent and time inconsistent, regressor being ln(price) and discount
factor/p (approximated by Taylor expantion up to order 1).
time consistent time inconsistent
ln(consumption) participation ln(consumption) participation
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DF1 -0.057 0.072 -0.050 0.011
(0.131) (0.132) (0.040) (0.038)
ln(price) -0.532∗∗ -0.060 -0.110 0.010 -0.448∗ -0.091 -0.034 0.009
(0.185) (0.129) (0.082) (0.044) (0.228) (0.155) (0.083) (0.051)
DF1
price 7.948 -3.878 2.132 -4.542
(12.28) (12.43) (4.177) (3.893)
Delta -0.005 0.087 -0.027 0.017
(0.090) (0.086) (0.035) (0.032)
Beta -0.123 0.0747 -0.130∗ -0.007
(0.174) (0.161) (0.057) (0.052)
Delta
price 1.832 -6.559 1.252 -3.296
(8.539) (8.334) (3.332) (3.082)
Beta
price 17.10 -1.974 12.12
∗ -0.273
(16.24) (14.95) (5.649) (5.064)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 6599 6599 25697 25697 6599 6599 25697 25697
R2 0.130 0.157 0.096 0.110 0.131 0.157 0.096 0.109
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.9: Results for consumption including nonsmoker with regressor being ln(price) and dis-
count factor/p (approximated by Taylor expantion up to order 1).
time consistent time inconsistent
consumption
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DF1 -8.934 -19.01 21.96
(10.52) (26.84) (25.25)
ln(price) -125.6∗ -19.94 -74.42 -19.29




Delta -5.649 -10.88 18.54
(7.304) (21.91) (19.76)









Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 25635 25635 25635 25635 25635 25635
R2 0.085 0.087 0.102 0.085 0.087 0.102
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.10: Results for time consistent and time inconsistent, regressor being
ln(price), discountfactor/p and 12 ∗ (discountfactor/p)
2 (approximated by Taylor expan-
tion up to order 2).
time consistent time inconsistent
ln(consumption) participation ln(consumption) participation
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DF1 0.190 0.325 -0.013 0.053
(0.173) (0.170) (0.057) (0.055)
ln(price) -0.625∗∗ -0.155 -0.125 -0.006 -0.507∗ -0.159 -0.070 -0.023









2 4753.9∗ 4915.8∗ 740.2 825.0
(2262.0) (2239.7) (805.2) (798.7)
Delta 0.099 0.196∗ 0.009 0.060
(0.094) (0.090) (0.041) (0.038)
Beta -0.129 0.081 -0.108 0.002




(11.06) (11.09) (5.453) (5.189)
Beta
price 18.71 -2.781 7.295 -2.354





2 998.5∗∗ 1035.6∗∗ 384.0 457.2∗





2 153.3 330.7 465.9 279.5
(3055.5) (3053.1) (1123.2) (1120.9)
gDF1 ≡ −UHHCλ 108.89 85.85 126.18 61.338
gδ ≡ −UHHCλ 50.28 35.54 59.17 36.37
gβ ≡ −UHHCλ - 8.19 118.91 -63.87 118.73
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 6599 6599 25697 25697 6599 6599 25697 25697
R2 0.131 0.158 0.096 0.110 0.132 0.158 0.096 0.110
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.11: Results for consumption including nonsmoker with regressor being
ln(price), discountfactor/p and 12 ∗ (discountfactor/p)
2 (approximated by Taylor expan-
tion up to order 2).
time consistent time inconsistent
consumption
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DF1 -8.934 37.21 81.64∗
(10.52) (38.61) (36.15)
ln(price) -148.6∗ -43.41 -98.27 -41.51











Delta -5.649 26.23 60.24∗
(7.304) (27.09) (24.41)





















gDF1 ≡ −UHHCλ 100.66 73.07
gδ ≡ −UHHCλ 52.995 38.48
gβ ≡ −UHHCλ -15.07 - 34.74
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 25635 25635 25635 25635 25635 25635
R2 0.085 0.087 0.102 0.085 0.088 0.103
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.12: Results for the effect of the price on the first-time quitting smoking.
time consistent time inconsistent
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4)
DF1 0.032 0.155
(0.082) (0.252)
Real price 0.0016∗∗ 0.001 0.0008 -0.0017











Initial consumption -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0009∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.00007)
Control Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period fixed effect No Yes No Yes
Regression OLS Probit OLS Probit
Observations 9872 9839 9872 9839
R2 0.081 0.082
Pseudo R2 0.166 0.167
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Chapter 3
The Effect of the Interaction
Between Price and Time Preference
on Cigarette Consumption: The
Case of Pregnant Women
3.1 Introduction
Attributable risk is widely used to represent the relationship between smoking and its health risks.
It is defined as the maximum proportion of a disease that is attributed by a certain characteristic
factor, holding other factors equal for all people (Lilienfeld and Stolley, 1994). Attributable risks
are distinguished between the smoking and nonsmoking group. In tobacco prevalent countries,
smoking-related circulatory and respiratory diseases account for a remarkable amount of chronic
illness. In particular, pregnant women who smoke face more risks than do members of the
general public. For example, pregnant women who smoke exhibit lower rates of fertilization, are
at greater risk for osteoporosis, and have a greater risk of natural miscarriage than other women.
Furthermore, smoking during pregnancy is a risk factor for low birth weight. (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2014)
Expansive health education and recent research have made the harmful consequences of smok-
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ing well known to smokers. Nevertheless, due to addiction, it is difficult for people who are willing
to give up smoking to successfully quit. For example, a Finnish survey has shown that (N=752)
58 percent of smokers who attempted to stop smoking failed to actually quit (Sosiaali, 1988). Be-
coming a parent is a great opportunity to stop smoking, especially for women. Pregnant women
are a future-oriented group: they care more about their future children’s health than the general
population. In this paper, I focus on how the probability of pregnant women quitting smoking
changes when cigarette price and discounted future extensive cost of smoking change. According
to the hypothesis, money price elasticity is smaller for individuals who are more future-oriented.
Recent studies have attempted to identify factors associated with smoking reduction. Godt-
fredsen et al. (2002), analyzed the relationship between smoking behavior and mortality. The
authors suggest that a decline in mortality from smoking-caused diseases did not reduce cigarette
smoking. Colman et al. (2003), use the Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring system (PRAMS)
survey data to estimate the direct effect of cigarette price on smoking during pregnancy. The
PRAMS data include 38,099 observations and were designed in particular to the response to the
decline in the rate of low birth weight births. Therefore, PRAMS is a particularly appropriate
data set for research on the smoking behavior of pregnant women. Using the PRAMS data,
Colman et al. (2003). were able to verify that the financial burden of cigarette smoking has a
greater effect on smoking cessation in pregnant women than in other groups.
In this paper, I use a data set from NLSY79 (National Longitudinal Surveys 79) to test
whether these same results hold. The NLSY79 data includes the smoking participation status
for pregnant women for 15 years and for the general population for 4 years. I will take the
smoking participation data from pregnant women as smoking status during the pregnancy and
take the same pregnant womenï£¡s previous year smoking participation from drug use for general
population as smoking status before pregnancy. Because smoking status for the general popu-
lation is only available for 4 years, there are far fewer observations available for the estimate of
probability of quitting.
The "full price" of cigarettes refers to the sum of the money price and the monetary value
of the expected future harm from smoking. To determine the monetary value of expected future
harm, I employ the discount rate, which is used to account for the value of risky behaviors. The
risk of future outcomes can be discounted today by a discount factor DF(β) = 1/(1 + r), where r
is the discount rate. The higher the discount rate, the lower the discount factor and the lower the
value assigned to the future outcome. As the discount rate rises, people are more likely to prefer
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instant gratification, resulting in lower monetary value of risky consequences. The point here is
that each percentage change in cigarette price represents a greater percentage change in the full
price the smaller the discount factor is. In spite of the case of time-consistent preference, the
same person may also face time-inconsistent preference. Individuals tend to delay their actions in
the short-run (Harris and Laibson, 2000). Individuals tend to act on the basis of instant rewards
and not on the basis of future rewards (Laibson, 1997, D.Cohen et al., 2004). Risk outcomes
are evaluated by individual preferences, although income level is another important concept for
evaluating health risk.
This paper focuses on cause-effect analysis from the vantage point of both health and eco-
nomics. First, because drug use restricts reproductive ability I want to examine the extent to
which pregnant women individually or collectively reduce smoking behavior in response to price
and personal preference. Individuals may sacrifice some present happiness to achieve a reduction
in the probability of future harmful outcomes. (Laibson, 1997, D.Cohen et al., 2004) Second,
same harmful consequences caused by smoking can be interpreted differently by the people who
have various future discount rate. Interacting the price with the discount factor can be more
precise in interpreting the price effect.
Besides the health risks caused by a smoking mother, the economic consequences of smoking
during pregnancy also entail great costs for government sponsored healthcare for mothers and
children. This paper also provides evidence of the effect of cigarette tax policy on the smoking
behavior of pregnant women and may thereby contribute to a reduction in healthcare expenditure
on medical benefits for pregnant women.
I use NLSY quasi-hypothetical reward question to measure personal preference. According
Johnson and Bickel (2002) and Madden et al. (2003), quasi-hypothetical questions have similar
results to empirical experiments. Following Courtemanche et al. (2015), I use the measure of





To test my hypothesis, I assume each individual lives for two periods. The lifetime utility function
is
V = U(H0, X,C) + βU(H.X1, C1). (3.1)
Here H0 is initial health and is exogenous. X is the consumption of a good other than cigarettes
in period 0, and C is the consumption of cigarettes in period 0. The price of X is $1, and the price
of cigarettes is p. The variables H, C1 and X1 are health, cigarette consumption, and the other
goods in period 1 respectively. β is the time discount factor for time. For simplicity, I assume
that lending and borrowing are not possible and ignore the selection of X1 and C1. Hence the
relevant budget constraint is
I = X + pC (3.2)
Finally, an increase in C lowers health in period 1(∂H/∂C ≡ Hc < 0)
The Lagrange function is
L = U(H0, X,C) + βU(H,X1, C1) + λ(I −X − pC),
where λ is the marginal utility of income.
The first order condition for C is
Uc + βUHHCd = λp
The second term on the right-hand side of the last equation is negative since UH > 0 and HC < 0.
The previous equation is rewritten as




Note that f ≡ −β UHHCλ defines the discounted monetary value of the loss in utility in period
1 due to smoking in period 0. Hence the full price of cigarettes (π) is
π ≡ p+ f
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The full price is higher the larger is the value of β.
One way to proceed is to specify a general demand function without assuming anything about
the form of the utility function:
C = C(I, π) (3.3)











Define ε as - Cπ πC , and note that ε is the elasticity of C with respect to full price π. Hence
e = (p/π)ε
If ε is constant, e rises as β falls because p/π rises as β falls. In words, people who discount
the future heavily have a more elastic demand function than those who do not because as one
percent change in money price is a larger percentage change in full price for the former group.
Because I am interested in the effect of cigarette price and the interaction between price and
the discount factor, I simplify the cigarette demand model as follows:
Ci,t = αPi,t + α1Pi,tβi + εi,t (3.4)




The effect of price should be negative. Since, if the price increases, the consumption of goods
will decrease. The coefficient of the discount factor should be negative because the greater the
discount factor (the smaller the discount rate), the lesser the amount of consumption. The
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coefficient of the interaction term should be positive. The bigger the β (smaller time preference
rate) is, the less patient people respond to the price. The full price includes monetary price of
cigarettes and expected monetary value of future harm. The people who appreciate the future
more, have bigger share in larger expected monetary value for the future consequences, therefore
should be less responsive to the current cigarette price. While impatient people care more about
the current cigarette cost, for instance poor and teenagers, are more sensitive to the cigarette
price change.
In the time inconsistent case, instead of the single discount factor, it consists of the long run
discount factor δ and the present-bias β. Economists have used the quasi-hyperbolic function: 1,
βδ, βδ2, ..βδt, .... When β ≤ 1, δ is constant for all the time and β captures the discount rates
decrease in time t. Short run time preference rate is greater than the long run time preference rate.
The best value for long run δ is 0.7 (Laibson, 1997). Most people overtime have a diminishing
the present-bias β. The quasi-hyperbolic examination shows that the average discount rate of β
is 0.8, next period become 0.7 or average 33% per year (Courtemanche et al., 2015).
3.2.2 Probit estimation
According to (Ai and Norton, 2003), assume a Probit model as
Pr[y = 1|x1, x2, X] = Φ(β1x1 + β2x2 + β12x1x2 +Xβ) (3.5)
Where X is a k x 1 vector of independent variables, including control variables, year dummy
and state dummy depending on the model. To derive the interaction effect of x1x2, first the
derivative with respect to x1 is:
∂Φ(· )
∂x1
= Φ′(β1 + β12x2) (3.6)




′(· ) + (β1 + β12x2)(β2 + β12x1)Φ′′(· ) (3.7)
In order to calculate the correct standard error, Ai and Norton (2003) suggests to use the
Delta method for the variance, derived from the Taylor expansion (Xu and long, 2005). The
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normal distribution of the interaction effect is shown as

























The t statistics is t = µ̂12/σ̂12. The hypothesis can be tested by using the t statistics.
To calculate the standard error of the interaction effect, I write the derivative for each estimate







′′x1 + [(β2 + β12x1)Φ





′′x2 + [(β1 + β12x2)Φ




= (Φ′ + β12Φ
′′x1x2) + [(β1x1 + β2x2 + 2β12x1x2)Φ











′′xk + (β1 + β12x2)(β2 + β12x1)Φ
′′′xk
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In the empirical analysis, the related results for the interaction effect are obtained by the
above equations. In the data , I will consider x1 as discount factor 1 and x2 as cigarette price.
3.3 Data
Excluding for cigarette price, all data are drawn from the National Longitudinal Surveys 1979
(NLSY79). This data is generally available every other year from 1979 to 2010. The dependent
variable is generated from pregnant women smoking participation, which was available in 1983,
1984, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 (15 year
periods). The 2010 and 2012 survey data are available now, however, since I only have cigarette
price data up to 2009, I used NLSY79 data up to 2008.
The dependent variable is a quitting smoking indicator, which equals 1 when smoking women
stop smoking after getting pregnant, and 0 otherwise. The smoking status of pregnant women is
available in the original questionnaire, which examines the smoking behavior of pregnant women,
whereas smoking status before pregnancy can only be obtained from general drug use answers,
which are only available in 1984 ,1992, 1994, 1998, 2008. This means that, in order to satisfy
the indicator condition that before- and during-pregnancy smoking participation status is non-
missing, many smoking status observations for pregnant women had to be dropped. Participation
data in 1984 is structured differently from 1992, 1994, 1998, and 2008. Specifically, there is no
question about "100 cigarettes smoked in entire life time" for the 1984 participation survey. In
NLSY79 individuals aged between 19 and 27 in 1984. Because, according previous research,
smokers are likely to begin smoking during this younger age range, I include the 1984 data in the
quitting model. All of the independent variables are time varying data, except for AFQT, being
from 1988, and the discount factor from 2006.
I am primarily interested in quitting-smoking behavior. In such cases, quitting refers to the
women who smoke before pregnancy and stop smoking after pregnancy. The data sample consists
of women who smoked before pregnancy and either continued to smoke or stopped smoking after
pregnancy. The quitting proportion of the total is 0.27 (56/205). By year, the proportions
are 0.23 (17/73=0.23) in 1984; 0.32 (20/63=0.32) in 1992; 0.29 (14/49=0.29) in 1994; and 0.25
(5/20=0.25) in 1998. These numbers are consistent with the findings of (Colman et al., 2003).
I consider both women who became pregnant during one period (31/124=0.25) and those who
became pregnant in two consecutive years (25/81=0.31). In the latter case, the women who stop
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smoking during any pregnancy are categorized as those who stopped smoking.
Data for prices and taxes come from Tax Burden on Tobacco (Volume 44, 2009). Data is at
the county level for the period from 1984 to 2009. Both price and tax are in the real term. The
base period of CPI is 1967=100. Taxes in the real term includes federal,state and county taxes.
I use monthly data (cigarette interview date) in NLSY79 to merge with cigarette prices to
match with state and county tax, which is a more effective way for cigarette price to capture the
tax change by month.
For the discount factor variable , one can refer to Chapter 2.
Table 3.1 is the summary list for all the control variables used in the equations. Table 3.2 is
the summary list for the all the key variables used in the equations.
3.4 Empirical analysis
3.4.1 Time consistent discount factor model
The estimating regression equation for the time consistent discount factor model is
Cit = α0 + α1DF1i + α2DEMOit + α3HCit + α4LABORit + α5FINit
+ εit (3.9)
where C is cigarette consumption or smoking participation; i represents individuals; DF1 is
the annual discount factor; DEMO includes age, gender, race and marital status; HC ( Human
Capital ) includes AFQT score and schooling dummies; LABOR includes work hours and occupa-
tion (for example, workers’ blue collar, white collar and service indicators); and FIN (Financial)
includes income, income squared and net worth. For consumption regression, I estimate data set
both with positive consumption and with consumption including nonsmoker.
Cit = α0 + α1DF1i + α2DEMOit + α3HCit + α4LABORit + α5FINit
+ α6Pct + α7DF1iPct + εit (3.10)
where Pct is the cigarette price varying by county level and by time. In contrast to the previous
equation which only examines the effect of the discount factor on cigarette consumption, I add
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cigarette price and the interaction term of price and the discount factor into this equation. If r is
bigger than 0 for the future benefit, then DF1 is always less than 1. The equation (3.10) includes
additional cigarette prices and the interaction of cigarette prices with the discount factor. I want
to examine how the discount factor influences the cigarette consumption through prices.
3.4.2 Smoking consumption and participation
Although this paper is interested in the quitting probabilities of pregnant women, first I want
to represent the general relationship between cigarette consumption and the discount factor for
pregnant women.
Table 3.3 displays the estimated results from equation (3.9). Column (1) is a simple estima-
tion without a price term for consumption. Consumption here indexes the number of cigarettes
people consumed during the last 30 days. Columns (2) and (3) are the results from the regression
on price and the interaction between price and the discount factor DF1, which follows equation
(3.10). Column (3) is estimated with both year and state fixed-effect. Columns (4) and (5),
(6) are following equation (3.9) and (3.10) respectively. Here, the dependent variable is smok-
ing participation for cigarettes, for which "smoked during last 30 days" is indicated by 1 and
"nonsmoker" is indicated by 0. The greater the discount factor (the lower the discount rate)
is, the more people are future-oriented, and the less people respond to changes in current price.
Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) show that the coefficient of DF1 is negative which means the dis-
count factor is negatively related to cigarette consumption. The price elasticity of participation
for the non-state fixed effect model in Table 3.3, column (1) is -0.56, similar to results obtained
by Chaloupka and Warner (2000). There is no price effect on the number of cigarettes smoked
in columns (2) and (3), which is consistent with previous findings (Colman et al., 2003).
I am interested in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6). The coefficient of price should be negative
because when price goes up, consumption should go down. The coefficient of interaction should be
positive, because the negative price effect will decrease when individuals tend to be more future-
oriented. Column (2), (3), (5) and (6) show reasonable results. Even though the coefficients of
the interaction term are not significant within the 10% confidence interval, the t-statistic for the
interaction (the coefficient divided by its standard error) is 1.33 for participation in column (5),
which is weakly significant. From these results, I conclude that people who are present-oriented
are more likely to smoke as cigarette price goes up, though the results were not significant.
From the coefficients of high school, some college and college. It is easy to see that as the level
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of education increases, the consumption of the cigarettes decreases (-116.9 shown in Table 3.3
and column (3)). As income increases, people become more concerned about their health, so the
coefficient of income is negative (-5.065 shown in Table 3.3 and column (3)). These results have
proved the rationale expectation. Compare to the consumption result with Table 5, we get the
negative price elasticity and the coefficient of interaction shows positive in Table 3.5. Estimate
results are improved a lot when I add the nonsmoker into the pure consumption population.
3.4.3 Quit probabilities
The results shown in Table 3.6 prove the hypothesis of quitting probabilities. First, for the probit
model, the interaction effect of probit is calculated from a cross derivative of the expected value of
smoking participation and its standard error is the result from the delta method. The hypothesis
here is that price increases the probability of quitting smoking. For the quitting indicator, I
defined that quitting=1 if a pregnant woman gives up smoking during her pregnancy period and
0 if a pregnant woman keep smoking .The price effect will be smaller for individuals who have
higher discount factors. That results in a negative sign for the interaction effect. In table 3.6,
column (5) and (6), I find positive price participation elasticity and a negative coefficient for the
interaction term, confirming the hypothesis. Second, in the linear probability model in Table 3.6,
column (2) and (3), price elasticity is correctly positive, and the interaction effect is negative,
consistent with my expectations.
3.4.4 Time inconsistent discount factor model
In the previous section, I analyzed the discount factor for the time consistent case. Next I will
consider the discount factor for the time-inconsistent case .
Cit = θ0 + θ1βi + θ2δi + θ3DEMOit + θ4HCit+ θ5LABORi
+ θ6FINit + ηit
(3.11)
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Cit = θ0 + θ1βi + θ2δi + θ3DEMOit + θ4HCit+ θ5LABORi
+ θ6FINit + θ7Pit + θ8(βi ∗ Pit)
+ θ9(δi ∗ Pit) + θ10ηit
(3.12)
where β is present-bias and δ is long-run patience. I assume that the discount factor decreases
as time T progresses. δ is constant over the course of an individual’s lifetime. β, which captures
the variation in time, is the value weighted to constant discount factor δ.
To concentrate the price and interaction effect, I temporarily simplify the demand function
in equation (3.12)
Ci,t = αPi,t + α1Pi,tβi + α2Pi,tδi + εi,t (3.13)
where: β and δ are the discount factor. The partial price effect is
∂Ci,t
∂Pi,t
= α+ α1βi + α2δi
Table 3.4 shows the results for the time-inconsistent case. Columns (1) and (2) are the regres-
sion results for equation (3.11) and (3.12), respectively. Column (3) is the estimation with year
and state fixed-effect. The discount factor should be negative since the higher discount factor
(the lower discount rate, referring to patient individuals) is less responsive to price change. In
columns (4) and (5), the participation regression indicate reasonable results. The interaction be-
tween price and the discount factor should be positive, because the negative price effect decreases
for individuals who are more future-oriented. In column (6), both coefficients of price interaction
are positive, but insignificant.
Table 3.5, column (5) is the result for consumption, which includes observations of nonsmokers
without state fixed-effect. It indicates that the price effect is negative and the interaction effect is
positive. Both results are consistent with the prediction. When compared to the oddly positive
price elasticity indicated in columns (2) and (3) in both Tables 3.3 and 3.4, columns (2) and
(5) in Table 3.5 show the negative sign. The reason is that the consumption data that includes
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nonsmokers tends to be less biased than the data that excludes nonsmokers.
Table 3.5, columns (3) and (6) do not show a negative price sign. This may be because there
was little state-to-state variation in price within a given year. The regression including state
fixed-effect tends to show a weaker result and, thus, is less reliable.
3.4.5 Full Price Model
The effect of Logarithm of the Price
One may recall that the full price of cigarettes is π = p+f , where f ≡ −β UHHCλ is the discounted
monetary value of the loss in utility in period 1 due to smoking in period 0, and β is the discount
factor. The point is that a one percent change in p is a bigger percentage change in π the smaller
is β. To see more detail, let the demand function be
C = α+ γ ln(p+ f) = α+ γ ln p+ γ ln[(p+ f)/p] + ε (3.14)
∂C
∂ ln p
= kγ, k ≡ p/(p+ f) (3.15)
I have β but do not have g ≡ −(UHHc)/λ. Since k rises as β falls, ∂C/∂ ln p should be bigger
in absolute value the smaller is β. So I would regress C on ln p and β ∗ ln p. The coefficient of
the interaction should be positive, while the coefficient of price should be negative when either
participation or consumption is the dependent variable. The regression model is:
C = γ0β + γ1 ln p+ γ2β ∗ ln p (3.16)
In this model, for the number of cigarettes consumed, ln C is used instead of C , because we
want to transform consumption into a small scale consistent with the scale of ln p. Otherwise,
the coefficient of ln p would be too large. For smoking participation, we will use the original data
form. The price effect, also the price elasticity is ∂C∂ ln p = γ1 + γ2β. A one percent increase in
price is a smaller percentage change in the full price for those who are more future oriented. So
the negative price effect should be smaller for them, therefore the interaction effect should be
positive.
58
For time inconsistent case, the discount factor β becomes two factors of δ and β, which δ is
constant over the period of lifetime, and β increases as time progresses. The estimation should
regress C on ln p, δ ∗ ln p and β ∗ ln p. The regression model is:
C = γ1β + γ2δ + γ3 ln p+ γ4β ∗ ln p+ γ5δ ∗ ln p (3.17)
The price elasticity equation is ∂C∂ ln p = γ3 + γ4β + γ5δ. This price effect should be negative
when participation or consumption is the dependent variable. When "quitting probability" is
the dependent variable, the price effect should be positive and the interaction term should be
negative.
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show the results of regressing consumption and smoking participation on ln
p and β*ln p for the time-consistent and time-inconsistent cases. For all results, the price effect is
negative and the interaction effect is positive. This is consistent with the theory that individuals
who are more future-oriented have less of a response to the price effect. For these individuals, the
negative price effect should be smaller and, therefore, the interaction effects should be positive.
Approximated full Price Model
Let consider one additional point in which future monetary loss is included. Set g ≡ −(UHHC)/λ.
The f = βg. I have a measure of β but do not have a measure of g. I will regress C on ln p and






This approximation is based on the Taylor expansion up to first order. If I use the approxi-
mation, C = α+γ ln p+γgβp−1. If g is a constant, the coefficient of βp−1 estimates γg. In either
case, the model I am going to estimate includes ln p and βp−1. Note that the sign of the inter-
action is the same as the sign of ln p and is negative. Since with ln p and hence p held constant,
an increase in β raises the full price of smoking (π) and hence lowers the probability of smoking
and the amount smoked given positive consumption. It still is the case that the price effect falls
as β rises. Here, the price effect of ln p is negative, but the price term in the interaction is 1p ,
which as a whole has positive effect on consumption. Because an increased β decreases positive
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price effect on consumption, the interaction term is negative.
C = α+ γ ln p+ γ ln[(p+ f)/p] = α+ γ ln p+ γ ln[1 + f/p] = α+ γ ln p+ γgβp−1 (3.18)
∂C
∂ ln p
= γ − γgβp−1 (3.19)
The second term on the right-hand side of the last equation is positive as long as gβ < p,
which is the assumption of the approximation. Given that, the right hand side of the equation
falls in absolute value as β rises. The last equation is the price elasticity of this model for smoking
participation and logarithm consumption.
Table 3.10 shows the time-consistent and time-inconsistent results for the full-price model
approximated by Taylor expansion order 1. In Table 3.11, the dependent variable changes to
cigarette consumption including nonsmokers. As predicted, both the price effect and the inter-
action effect are negative, which proves my hypothesis that as β rises, the positive price effect
of 1p on consumption and smoking participation declines. The coefficient of the interaction term
in the table 3.11 seems very large, but this is because the independent variable "consumption
with nonsmoker" ranges from 0 to 1200. However, the value of discountfactor/price ranges
from 1.14e-06 to .0140684 with a mean of .0057, calculated from the mean of the discount factor
(0.558) and price (99.71).












The estimate model becomes











= γ − γgβp−1 + γg
2β2
p2
= γ(1− gβp−1 + g2β2p−2) (3.21)
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The regression function is
C = γ ln p+ γgδp−1 + γgβp−1 (3.22)
It is still true that the price effect is negative
∂C
∂ ln p
= γ − γgδp−1 − γgβp−1 (3.23)



























The regression model form is







Table 3.12 shows the results of the full-price model approximated by Taylor expansion up to
order 2. In column (1), (2) and (4), the coefficients of the second interaction term show the
positive sign, which is consistent with the hypothesis.
Probit estimation for The effect of the Logarithm of the Price
In the probit model, the regression model for the effect of the logarithm of the price is
Pr[y = 1|x1, x2, X] = Φ(β1β + β2 ln p+ β12β ln p+Xγ)
where x1 is applied to β, and x2 to ln p.g
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Similarly the time inconsistent equation is
Pr[y = 1|x1, x2, x3, X] = Φ(β1β + β2δ + β3 ln p+ β13β ln p+ β23δ ln p+Xγ)
When the probability of quitting is the dependent variable, the coefficient of price should be
positive and the coefficient of the interaction should be negative. The detailed calculation for
the coefficient and standard error of the interaction term are shown in Section 2.2., where I can
apply x1 to β, and x2 to ln p in the time-consistent case.
Table 3.14 shows the results of the time-consistent and time-inconsistent cases for the quitting
probability of pregnant women. I regress quitting index (either 0 or 1) on lnp and β ∗ ln p. As
explained in Section 4.5.1., the price effect of ∂C∂ ln p = kγ, where k ≡ p/(p+ f), should be bigger
in absolute value the smaller is β, since k rises as β falls.
In the table, excluding the regression with adding state fixed-effect, the coefficients of price
show a positive sign, which is explained by the theory that when price goes up, the probability of
quitting smoking also goes up. The coefficients of the interaction term all present a negative sign,
which means that the positive price effect decreases when individuals are more future-oriented.
Probit estimation for Approximated full Price Model





Since g is not a variable available in the data, the estimated coefficient of βp includes the value
of g. Later I will estimate g by using Taylor expansion up to second order to estimate g.
Recall the Probit model I assumed before
Pr[y = 1|x1, x2, X] = Φ(β1x1 + β2x2 + β12x1x2 +Xγ)
The estimation equation for the full price model using Taylor expansion up to first order is
Pr[y = 1|x1, x2, X] = Φ(β1β + β2 ln p+ β12gβp−1 +Xγ) (3.25)




= Φ′(β1 + β12p
−1)
then with respect to p−1:




′(· ) + (β1 + β12p−1)(β2(−p) + β12β)Φ′′(· ) (3.26)
In order to calculate the correct standard error, Ai and Norton (2003) paper suggest using
the Delta method for the variance derived from the Taylor expansion (Xu and long, 2005). The
normal distribution of the interaction effect is shown as



























The t statistics is t = µ̂12/σ̂2. It is easy to test the hypothesis by using the t statistics.
To calculate the standard error of the interaction effect, I write the derivative for each estimate
as follows. Set ∂
2Φ(·)
∂x1∂x2








′′ ln p+ (β1 + β12p
−1)Φ′′ ∗ (−p) + (β1 + β12p−1)(β2(−p) + β12β)Φ′′′ ln p
∂S
∂β12
= (Φ′ + β12Φ











′′xk + (β1 + β12p
−1)(β2(−p) + β12β)Φ′′′xk
The equation above is used to calculate the standard error in the interaction term in the
probit full-price model approximated by Taylor expansion up to order 1.
Table 3.15 shows an empirical result for Taylor expansion order 1 approximation. The effect
of price on quitting smoking should be positive. The interaction term of (discountfactor/price)
is positive. For this term, the price effect of p−1 is negative on quitting smoking. A one percent
increase in price is a smaller percentage change in the full price for those individuals who are
more future-oriented. The negative price effect in interaction term should be smaller for these
individuals and, thus the interaction effect should be positive. The sign of price elasticity and
interaction shown in the table 3.15 are all consistent with my prediction, even though results are
statistically insignificant.
In the time-inconsistent case, two discount factors that interact with price need to be consid-
ered. β and δ are two different discount factors, the demand function for the probit model with
the full-price model approximated by Taylor expansion up to first order is
Pr[y = 1|x1, x2, x3, X] = Φ(β1β + β2δ + β3 ln p+ β13βp−1 + β23δp−1 +Xγ)
Where p indicates cigarette price. X is a k x 1 vector of independent variables, including
control variables, year dummy and state dummy.
In this case, the effect of price is
∂Φ(· )
∂ ln p
= Φ′(β3 − β13βp−1 − β23δp−1)
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To calculate interaction effect for β, first, the derivative with respect to β is:
∂Φ(· )
∂β
= Φ′(β1 + β13p
−1)




′(· ) + (β1 + β13p−1)(β3(−p) + β13β + β23δ)Φ′′(· ) (3.28)
To calculate the interaction effect for δ, first, the derivative with respect to gδ:
∂Φ(· )
∂δ
= Φ′(β2 + β23p
−1)




′(· ) + (β2 + β23p−1)(β3(−p) + β13β + β23δ)Φ′′(· ) (3.29)
As noted in equation (3.27), in the probit model the interaction effect can be shown as a normal
distribution with standard error adjusted by the delta method. To construct the matrix for it,
I will write few representative derivations, which should be that each coefficient with respect to
the interaction effect of β in equation (3.28) and to the interaction effect of δ in equation (3.29).
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= (Φ′ + β13Φ
′′βp−1) + (p−1β3(−p) + 2β13p−1β + p−1β23δ + β1β)Φ′′
+(β1 + β13p




′′δp−1 + [β1 + β13p
−1)δΦ′′ + (β1 + β13p
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′′xk + (β1 + β13p
−1)(β3(−p) + β13β + β23δ)Φ′′′xk
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′′βp−1 + (β2 + β23p
−1)βΦ′′ + (β2 + β23p
−1)(β3(−p) + β13β + β23δ)Φ′′′βp−1
∂S
∂β23
= (Φ′ + β23Φ
′′δp−1) + (p−1β3(−p) + 2β23p−1δ + p−1β13β + β2δ)Φ′′
+(β2 + β23p




′′x4 + (β2 + β23p





′′xk + (β2 + β23p
−1)(β3(−p) + β13β + β23δ)Φ′′′xk
Table 3.15 shows the results.
3.4.6 First differences Model
With regard to the panel data analysis, the traditional way to solve the unobservable individual
fixed-effect problem is to take first differences , which individual fixed effect will drop out of the
equation. Even though this method leads to some inconsistent estimator problems, which can be
improved by the GMM method, I still prefer to use this method to improve my estimate results.
The first reason that I prefer to take first differences is that, in spite of including many control
variables, the estimate of price effect will be affected by the unobserved individual effect, for
example personal taste or the smoking status of a family member. Second, the change in price
will have a more direct effect on quitting probability and, thus, the interaction effect will be more
explicit.
A discrete time linear probability hazard model, suggested by Margolis et al. (2013) is the
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first differences from a log smoking-participation model. The log smoking-participation model
will be
ln sit = α0 − α1DF1i − α2DEMOit − α3HCit − α4LABORit − α5FINit
− α6Pct − α7DF1iPct − α7fi − εit (3.30)
where fi is the individual fixed effect. After first differences, all time-invariant individual
characteristics, such as fi, DF1i and schooling level will drop out.
Before making difference for the equation, consider a derivation:
St ≡ St−1 −Qt
where St is the number of smokers in period t and Q is the number of quitters in period t.














≡ 1− qt ⇒ ln
st
st−1
≡ ln(1− qt) ' −q (3.31)
where st and st−1 are the smoking participation rates and qt is the quit rate.
Now taking the first differences, one gets
−(ln st − ln st−1) ' qt
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qt = α2(DEMOi,t −DEMOi,t−1) + α3(HCi,t −HCi,t−1) + α4(LABORi,t + LABORi,t−1)
+α5(FINi,t − FINi,t−1) + α6(Pc,t − Pc,(t−1)) + α7DF1i(Pc,t − Pc,(t−1)) + α8(εi,t − εi,t−1)
(3.32)
Equation (31), shows that the regression of the first difference of the log of smoking partici-
pation is approximately the same as that of the quit rate with reversed signs. It indicates that
we can use the log smoking-participation function to obtain a quit function. The advantage of
using this first different log smoking-participation function is that it allows one to drop out indi-
vidual fixed effects. The regression results are shown in Table 3.17. If the difference in cigarette
price between period t and period t-1 increases, the quitting probability of pregnant women also
increases. This result can be verified in all the columns by calculating the price effect, which is
always positive. The coefficient of interaction is negative because if the discount factor increases,
the price effect for those individuals who are more future-oriented will decline. These results
tend to suggest that future-oriented individuals have less of a response to changes in price.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of cigarette prices on the quitting probability of pregnant women.
I focus on the role of time preference and the interaction between time preference and price in
determining these outcomes. I explore an empirical measure of time preference and apply it to a
data set of the smoking behavior of pregnant women to test my hypothesis. I find that people who
discount the future consequences of their current actions heavily are likely to be more sensitive
to price than those who do not.
Most results show that the discount factor is negatively associated with the number of
cigarettes consumed and with smoking participation. The higher the discount factor, the lower
is consumption and participation; the result is the opposite when the independent variable is
quitting probability. I conclude that among pregnant women, those individuals who are present-
oriented, i.e. do not value the future highly, are more likely to smoke and more sensitive to price
than those who are not .
The coefficient of the interaction term should be positive when the independent variable is
consumption or smoking participation (e.g. Table 3.5 and 3.8), but negative given the indepen-
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dent variable is quitting probability (e.g. Table 3.6 and 3.14). Increased price results in a higher
quitting probability. This positive price effect becomes smaller as the discount factor increases.
Therefore, the coefficient of interaction between price and the discount factor presents a negative
sign for quitting probability. In my results, the interaction term correctly shows a negative sign
for quitting probability, and shows a positive sign for consumption and smoking participation.
These results suggest an important role for time preference in the smoking behavior of preg-
nant women. It implies that the price effect on cigarette consumption or quitting probability is
influenced by time preference. Therefore, in practice, policymakers should consider both determi-
nants when they try to decrease the consumption of cigarettes or increase the quitting probability
of pregnant women.
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Table 3.1: Variable Summary for quitting regression (205 observations).
Variable Name Description Mean
(Std. errors)
Age Age in years 28.58
(5.08)
Race:black 1 if race is black 0.36
(0.48)
Race:other 1 if race is neither black nor white 0.063
(0.244)
Married 1 if married 0.415
(0.494)
AFQT percentile score on armed forces qualifying test in 1985 31.79
(22.80)
High school 1 if highest grade is completed=12 0.532
(0.50)
Some college 1 if 13 ≤highest grade completed ≤ 15 0.215
(0.412)
College 1 if highest grade completed 16 ≥ 0.063
(0.244)
White collar 1 if current occupation is white collar 0.564
(0.43)
Blue collar 1 if current occupation is blue collar 0.18
(0.305)
Service 1 if current occupation is service 0.256
(0.392)
Hours worked Average hours worked per week in the preceding year 21.26
(18.75)
Income Total household income(units of $10, 000 2.17
(4.37)
Income2 The square of total household income(units of $10, 000 23.73
(249.23)
Net worth Household asset minus liabilities in 2004(units of $10, 000) 3.302
(4.01)
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Table 3.2: Variable Summary for quitting regression (205 observation).
Variable Name Description Mean
(Std. errors)
Quit Stop smoking during pregnancy 0.273
(0.44)
Cigarette price Cigarette price including fed and state tax adjusted by year 1960 CPI 91.229
(9.236)
ln(price) the logarithm of real cigarette price 4.51
(0.104)
Discount factor 1 Computed from amount needed to wait a year to receive $1, 000 0.569
(0.279)
Discount factor 2 Computed from amount needed to wait a year to receive $1, 000 0.261
(0.373)
Delta Computed using the quasi-hyperbolic discounting specification 0.765
(0.348)
Beta Computed using quasi-hyperbolic discounting specification 0.754
(0.225)
pregnant consumption The number of cigarettes smoked per month (1769 obs) 473.66
(285.32)
Smoking participation Smoking or not (Smoking is 1, not is 0) during last month (6693 obs) 0.264
(0.441)
pregnant consumption add observation of nonsmoker into pregnant consumption (6693 obs) 125.191
including nonsmoker (255.224)
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Table 3.3: Results for pregnant woman time consistent OLS regressions.
consumption participation
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Discount factor (DF1) 19.89 -202.7 -242.2 0.003 -0.078 -0.097
(28.43) (196.5) (199.9) (0.026) (0.095) (0.0962)
real price -0.972 0.221 -0.002∗ -0.0008
(1.626) (1.858) (0.0009) (0.001)
Discount factor*price 2.266 2.672 0.0008 0.001
(2.005) (2.022) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Age 9.555∗ 7.519∗ 9.456∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(3.806) (3.735) (3.786) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Married -39.22∗ -32.83 -39.58∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗
(18.49) (17.86) (18.47) (0.017) (0.018) (0.0171)
AFQT_adj1 0.455 0.429 0.463 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0003
(0.474) (0.469) (0.476) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Highschool -42.20∗ -36.95 -43.57∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(20.96) (20.46) (20.79) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Somecollage -96.66∗∗∗ -85.89∗∗ -97.99∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗
(28.46) (28.59) (28.32) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Collage -115.7∗ -101.2∗ -116.9∗ -0.326∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗
(46.54) (47.16) (47.28) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Whitecollar 4798.9 357.3 6918.5 0.10 0.145∗ 0.118
(55706.7) (57426.9) (58505.3) (0.108) (0.0599) (0.110)
Blucollar 4835.5 397.9 6955.2 0.100 0.143∗ 0.122
(55707.2) (57427.5) (58505.7) (0.110) (0.061) (0.113)
Service 4832.0 392.4 6949.9 0.157 0.212∗∗ 0.179
(55706.3) (57426.8) (58504.6) (0.113) (0.065) (0.116)
hourwork 0.092 0.064 0.070 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005
(0.591) (0.605) (0.592) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Networth -2.856∗∗ -2.646∗ -2.725∗∗ -0.0009∗ -0.001∗ -0.0009∗
(0.964) (1.083) (0.963) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Income -5.867 -3.724 -5.065 -0.00194 -0.001 -0.002
(10.58) (10.33) (10.68) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∂smokingparticipation
∂price .272 1.688 -.0015 -.00026
( 1.126 ) ( 1.580 ) (.00075) ( .0008)
Price elasticity .056 .350 -.562 -.097
(.233 ) ( .327) ( .281 ) ( .299 )
Year/State fixed effect Yes /Yes Yes / No Yes /Yes Yes /Yes Yes / No Yes /Yes
Regression OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 1769 1769 1769 6702 6702 6702
R2 0.095 0.058 0.097 0.142 0.115 0.143
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.4: Results for pregnant woman time inconsistent OLS regressions.
consumption participation
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Delta 3.571 -90.16 -94.92 -0.019 -0.118 -0.113
(24.34) (146.3) (139.9) (0.019) (0.093) (0.094)
Beta 14.48 -99.50 -167.7 0.04 -0.016 -0.044
(46.08) (206.6) (211.3) (0.03) (0.128) (0.119)
Real price -1.318 -0.421 -0.003 -0.002
(2.689) (2.408) (0.002) (0.002)
Beta*price 1.224 1.868 0.0006 0.0008
(2.15) (2.23) (0.001) (0.001)
Delta*price 0.938 0.995 0.001 0.001
(1.507) (1.431) (0.0008) (0.0009)
∂smokingparticipation
∂price .295 1.713 -.001 -.0002
(1.365) (.0009 ) (.0007) (.001)
Price elasticity .061 .355 -.0003 -.00005
(.236 ) ( .283) (.0002 ) ( .0002 )
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Regression OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 1769 1769 1769 6702 6702 6702
R2 0.094 0.058 0.096 0.143 0.116 0.143
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
74
Table 3.5: Results for pregnant women consumption including all nonsmoker.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Discount factor (DF1) 6.987 -60.09 -70.57
(15.02) (57.36) (57.03)
Real price -1.034 -0.104 -1.389 -0.488
(0.609) (0.579) (1.007) (1.014)
Discount factor*price 0.712 0.779
(0.576) (0.568)
Delta -7.787 -66.42 -62.96
(9.846) (44.42) (43.43)







∂price -0.636 0.331 -.616 .347
(0.492) (0.462) (.560) (.546)
Price elasticity -0.507 0.264 -.491 .276
( 0.392) (0.368) (.446) ( .435)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Regression OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 6694 6694 6694 6694 6694 6694
R2 0.128 0.099 0.128 0.129 0.100 0.129
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
DF1=Discount factor 1
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Table 3.6: Results for quitting smoking while pregnancy in time consistent case.
Dependent var: (1) quit (2) quit (3) quit (4) quit (5) quit (6) quit
Discount factor (DF1) 0.105 1.226 0.412 0.331 4.555 1.417
(0.112) (1.269) (1.406) (0.359) (4.228) (6.022)
Real price 0.015 0.012 0.053 0.056
(0.008) (0.01) (0.03) (0.049)
Discount factor*price -0.012 -0.004 -0.046 -0.016
(0.014) (0.016) (0.046) (0.065)
∂smokingparticipation
∂price .008 .0096 .015 .014
( 0.005 ) (.009 ) (.008) ( .01)
Price elasticity 2.673 3.207 5.01 4.677
(1.601 ) ( 2.937)
Interaction effect of probit -.019 -.006
(.040) ( .025)
Year/State fixed effect Yes/No Yes/ No Yes/Yes Yes / No Yes/No Yes/Yes
Regression OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit
R2 0.126 0.144 0.316
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.134 0.264
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 176
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.7: Results for quitting smoking while pregnancy in time inconsistent case.
Dependent var: (1) quit (2) quit (3) quit (4) quit (5) quit (6) quit
Delta 0.062 0.404 0.332 0.219 1.750 2.223
(0.09) (1.14) (1.28) (0.29) (3.92) (4.77)
Beta 0.119 3.468∗ 1.896 0.301 14.23∗∗ 8.723
(0.16) (1.36) (1.52) (0.50) (4.90) (6.39)
Real price 0.041∗ 0.029 0.165∗∗ 0.141
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08)
Delta*price -0.004 -0.003 -0.016 -0.023
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Beta*price -0.038∗ -0.021 -0.155∗∗ -0.098
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
∂smokingparticipation
∂price .009 .011 0.046 .035
( 0.005 ) (.009 ) ( .017) (.021)
Price elasticity 3.136 3.535 15.37 11.69
(1.553 ) ( 2.855)
Interaction effect of probit for Beta -.061 -.039
( .031) (1.491 )
Interaction effect of probit for Delta -.007 -.009
(.093 ) ( .336 )
Year/State fixed effect Yes/No Yes/ No Yes/Yes Yes / No Yes/No Yes/Yes
Regression OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit
R2 0.127 0.165 0.322
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.158 0.271
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 176
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.8: Results for time consistent and inconsistent OLS model, regressor being ln(price) and
discount factor*ln(price).
time consistent time inconsistent
ln(consumption) participation ln(consumption) participation
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DF1 -1.717 -2.074 -0.475 -0.567
(1.682) (1.687) (0.485) (0.493)
ln(price) -0.156 -0.161 -0.129 -0.10 -0.139 -0.208 -0.201 -0.176
(0.235) (0.232) (0.07) (0.07) (0.404) (0.407) (0.141) (0.142)
DF*ln(price) 0.384 0.462 0.105 0.124
(0.368) (0.369) (0.106) (0.107)
Delta -0.873 -0.871 -0.535 -0.533
(1.069) (1.054) (0.385) (0.395)
Beta -0.296 -0.948 -0.234 -0.333
(1.907) (1.944) (0.678) (0.673)
Beta*ln(price) 0.072 0.213 0.061 0.080
(0.416) (0.425) (0.147) (0.146)
Delta*ln(price) 0.192 0.192 0.113 0.112
(0.233) (0.229) (0.084) (0.086)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Regression OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 1769 1769 6702 6702 1769 1769 6702 6702
R2 0.051 0.090 0.108 0.135 0.050 0.089 0.109 0.136
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.9: Results for consumption including all nonsmoker with ln(price) and Discount fac-
tor*ln(price) .
consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DF1 10.44 -387.5 -441.7
(15.21) (299.9) (297.8)
ln(price) -74.62 -54.17 -109.4 -91.14
(43.98) (42.19) (84.56) (82.06)
DF1*ln(price) 86.70 97.76
(65.80) (65.29)
Delta -6.829 -333.2 -329.8
(10.13) (201.0) (201.5)






Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No No Yes No No Yes
Regression OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 6693 6693 6693 6693 6693 6693
R2 0.093 0.093 0.122 0.093 0.094 0.122
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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p (Taylor expansion order 1).
time consistent time inconsistent
ln(consumption) participation ln(consumption) participation
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DF1 0.492 0.603 0.197 0.226
(0.381) (0.375) (0.118) (0.119)
ln(price) -0.186 -0.202 -0.171∗ -0.149∗ -0.194 -0.329 -0.338∗ -0.339∗
(0.228) (0.224) (0.069) (0.071) (0.380) (0.382) (0.132) (0.132)
DF1
price -43.64 -54.31 -18.31 -21.70
(35.99) (35.74) (11.13) (11.18)
Delta 0.255 0.275 0.166 0.178∗
(0.237) (0.229) (0.087) (0.088)
Beta 0.135 0.352 0.234 0.276
(0.433) (0.442) (0.153) (0.151)
Delta
price -24.06 -25.96 -17.71
∗ -18.86∗
(22.84) (22.26) (8.308) (8.393)
Beta
price -9.505 -31.24 -18.45 -23.25
(41.30) (42.19) (14.70) (14.54)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1769 1769 6702 6702 1769 1769 6702 6702
R2 0.051 0.090 0.108 0.136 0.051 0.089 0.109 0.137
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
80
Table 3.11: Results for pregnant women consumption including nonsmoker in time consistent





expansion order 1) .
consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DF1 10.44 144.2 165.3∗
(15.21) (74.37) (73.89)
ln(cigarette price) -97.63∗ -83.13∗ -174.9∗ -180.2∗





Delta -6.829 101.2∗ 110.9∗
(10.13) (47.96) (46.84)









Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 6694 6694 6694 6694 6694 6694
R2 0.093 0.094 0.122 0.094 0.094 0.123
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.12: Results for time consistent and time inconsistent OLS model, regressor being















2. (Taylor expansion order 2).
time consistent time inconsistent
ln(consumption) participation ln(consumption) participation
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DF1 0.702 0.797 0.195 0.237
(0.419) (0.415) (0.141) (0.142)
ln(price) -0.271 -0.284 -0.171∗ -0.153∗ -0.142 -0.267 -0.294∗ -0.284
(0.241) (0.239) (0.075) (0.077) (0.411) (0.408) (0.149) (0.149)
DF1
price -86.50 -94.22 -17.96 -23.96





2 3934.0 3685.0 -31.42 205.2
(2829.4) (2798.3) (1403.8) (1399.3)
Delta 0.279 0.296 0.143 0.169
(0.244) (0.237) (0.093) (0.094)
Beta 0.030 0.228 0.187 0.195
(0.525) (0.526) (0.207) (0.208)
Delta
price -36.08 -37.01 -12.96 -17.06
(25.05) (24.98) (10.83) (10.80)
Beta
price 14.02 -4.108 -9.047 -7.131





2 976.7 908.0 -222.3 -86.83





2 -1583.1 -1841.4 -733.9 -1171.9
(4113.5) (4274.5) (2027.3) (2025.9)
g ≡ −UHHCλ 45.48 39.11 -1.77 8.56
gδ ≡ −UHHCλ 25.962 24.534 -17.15 -5.09
gβ ≡ −UHHCλ 112.92 -448.25 -81.12 -164.34
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1769 1769 6702 6702 1769 1769 6702 6702
R2 0.052 0.091 0.108 0.136 0.052 0.090 0.110 0.137
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.13: Results for pregnant women consumption including nonsmoker with regression on
taylor expansion up to order 2.
consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DF1 10.44 176.3 204.0∗
(15.21) (91.02) (90.76)
ln(cigarette price) -111.0∗ -99.42∗ -155.1 -155.2










Delta -6.829 102.3∗ 119.5∗
(10.13) (49.75) (48.76)





















gDF1 ≡ −UHHCλ 30.47 30.93
gδ ≡ −UHHCλ 0.823 0.056
gβ ≡ −UHHCλ -166.42 -226.84
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effect No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 6694 6694 6694 6694 6694 6694
R2 0.093 0.094 0.122 0.094 0.094 0.123
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.14: Results for quitting smoking of time consistent and inconsistent case, and regressor
being ln(price) and discount factor*ln(price) and Delta ∗ ln(price) and Beta ∗ ln(price).
Dependent var: quit time consistent time inconsistent
DF1 4.991 2.291 19.24 14.10
(5.458) (6.313) (18.16) (26.54)
ln(price) 1.012 0.280 3.859 1.227 3.036∗ 1.658 13.22∗ 8.403
(0.664) (0.898) (2.376) (3.713) (1.369) (1.755) (5.576) (7.524)
DF1*ln(price) -1.084 -0.500 -4.183 -3.098
(1.212) (1.404) (4.023) (5.861)
Delta 1.926 2.219 9.411 17.02
(4.962) (5.838) (16.74) (20.69)
Beta 13.76∗ 7.596 58.88∗∗ 36.35
(5.971) (6.878) (22.24) (29.85)
Delta*ln(price) -0.414 -0.482 -2.023 -3.718
(1.095) (1.291) (3.688) (4.559)
Beta*ln(price) -3.046∗ -1.693 -13.03∗∗ -8.085
(1.334) (1.541) (4.943) (6.634)
Price elasticity .394 -.004 18.26 5.20 .42 .01 60.94 31.62
( .30 ) (.48 ) ( .302 ) (.47 )
Interaction effect -1.664 -1.228
of probit (DF1) 13.025 2.778
Inter effect -5.120 -3.223
probit (β) (10.403) (4.796)
Inter effect -.812 -1.479
probit (δ) ( 22.624 ) ( 9.679 )
Year/State
fixed effect Yes/ No Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/ No Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/Yes
Regression OLS OLS Probit Probit OLS OLS Probit Probit
Observations 205 205 205 176 205 205 205 176
R2 0.138 0.306 0.156 0.312
Pseudo R2 0.131 0.245 0.152 0.253
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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p (Taylor expansion order 1).
Dep var: quit time consistent time inconsistent
DF1 -0.657 -0.159 -2.669 -2.081
(1.192) (1.356) (3.809) (5.582)
ln(price) 0.846 0.122 3.252 0.813 2.289 0.945 9.656∗ 5.715
(0.665) (0.882) (2.310) (3.716) (1.366) (1.684) (4.844) (7.189)
DF1
price
68.24 17.29 273.2 198.2
(106.5) (119.9) (343.6) (512.6)
Delta 0.002 -0.078 -0.157 -2.152
(1.033) (1.193) (3.259) (4.197)
Beta -2.314 -1.093 -9.701∗ -5.632
(1.404) (1.599) (4.522) (6.303)
δ
price
4.887 10.45 36.99 213.2
(95.15) (108.6) (302.1) (389.0)
β
price
212.0 96.13 883.8∗ 497.3
(122.0) (137.8) (398.5) (561.1)
Price elastic .42 .014 15.41 3.44 .47 .053 44.94 24.08
( .294 ) ( .479 ) ( .299 ) (.478 )
Inter effect 109.038 78.69
probit ( DF1) (149297.97) (18941.32)
Inter effect 351.51 198.40
probit (β) (9137.55) (22884.65)
Inter effect 16.11 85.02
probit (δ) ( 174687.2) ( 21149.89)
Year/State
fixed effect Yes/ No Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/ No Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/Yes
Regression OLS OLS Probit Probit OLS OLS Probit Probit
Observations 205 205 205 176 205 205 205 176
R2 0.137 0.306 0.148 0.308
Pseudo R2 0.130 0.245 0.144 0.249
The coefficients of interaction are large.
The estimated probit model is Pr[y = 1|x1, x2, X] = Φ(β1β + β2 ln p+ β12gβp−1 +Xγ).
Since the only variable available are the discount factor and price, the the coefficient of interaction that results
from the regression is the combination of real coefficent of interaction and g, which is the monetary value of
future consequences. Thus, the standard error calculated based on the combined coefficient are not the real one
for the interaction term.
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2. (Taylor expansion order 2).
time consistent time inconsistent
Dependent var: (1) quit (2) quit (3) quit (4) quit (5) quit (6) quit (7) quit (8) quit
DF1 -0.283 0.192 -1.164 -0.349
(1.130) (1.376) (3.684) (5.496)
ln(price) 0.674 -0.018 2.485 -0.303 1.627 0.327 6.419 1.321
(0.627) (0.875) (2.149) (3.696) (1.318) (1.636) (4.483) (7.197)
DF1
price -11.16 -66.94 5.923 -170.6





2 7415.9 8635.5 20895.9 34654.0
(6316.7) (7514.0) (19517.3) (26494.7)
Delta 0.453 0.351 2.031 0.101
(0.866) (1.034) (2.937) (3.655)
Beta -1.701 -0.323 -6.896 -0.462
(1.350) (1.554) (4.439) (6.486)
δ
price -69.98 -67.24 -266.7 -129.8
(82.82) (99.18) (295.5) (360.4)
β
price 81.50 -67.27 333.5 -454.0





2 3582.3 4094.7 10654.6 14410.8





2 10054.5 12536.6 39247.3 63657.2
(8848.1) (10282.5) (30438.2) (36756.4)
gDF1 ≡ −UHHCλ -3527.62 203.13
gδ ≡ −UHHCλ 39.95 31.74
gβ ≡ −UHHCλ -117.68 140.21
Year/State
fixed effect Yes/ No Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/ No Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/Yes
Regression OLS OLS Probit Probit OLS OLS Probit Probit
Observations 205 205 205 176 205 205 205 176
R2 0.143 0.312 0.167 0.330
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.252 0.159 0.274
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 3.17: Results for first differences of quitting probability.
time consistent time inconsistent
Dependent var: (1) quit (2) quit (3) quit (4) quit (5) quit (6) quit (7) quit (8) quit
diff(price) 0.013∗ 0.012∗ 0.040∗ 0.036 0.016 0.013 0.049 0.036
(0.005) (0.006) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010) (0.029) (0.031)
diff(DF1*price) -0.006 -0.003 -0.022 -0.009
(0.006) (0.007) (0.020) (0.022)
diff(Beta*price) -0.002 0.0006 -0.006 0.011
(0.007) (0.009) (0.024) (0.028)
diff(Delta*price) -0.007 -0.005 -0.021 -0.016
(0.005) (0.006) (0.017) (0.017)
Control Vars. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression OLS OLS Probit Probit OLS OLS Probit Probit
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205
R2 0.034 0.092 0.038 0.096
Pseudo R2 0.028 0.082 0.032 0.087
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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